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THE CINDERELLA OF THEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT [1]

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MORE than once the doctrine of the Spirit (Pneumatology) has been called the Cinderella of Theology. If this was so in the past, and is perhaps still, it now requires our full attention. At the risk of viewing the situation through 'continental' eyes, but hoping you will recognize this, I would say that the nineteenth century, impressed by the advance of science, confronted theology in the first place with problems raised by natural science. Its first question concerned the nature of God, especially in connection with creation. Scientific historical inquiry paid attention to the Bible, and in the New Testament focussed its interest upon the question of the historical Jesus. This work culminated and came to a temporary halt in Albert Schweitzer's, The Quest of the Historical Jesus. A revival of Systematic Theology and Dogmatics followed, and in the opinion of the dogmatists the connecting lines between theology viewed from a cosmic standpoint and the Gospel were too long. The same thing was seen happening in the historical study of religions which came to cover an ever-widening field. On the other hand, however, they could not be satisfied with a 'life of Jesus,' so that Christology began to occupy a central place which it has held during the last few decades. And, if Pneumatology received any attention at all, its allotted place was small.

In any case, the doctrine of the Spirit was approached from a conception of the Trinity, closed or unfolded in its different elements. And this happened even when theologians tried to return

[1] A paper read at a conference at Le Chambon arranged by the International Congregational Council.

to a supposed Biblical period prior to any conception of the Trinity. There remained the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, conceptions determined by many factors, and approached from the christological angle: without the Son it was impossible to speak of the Father; without Christ one could not understand the Holy Spirit. It seems to me that this emphasis is now shifting, and that it should do so. The deep concern with anthropological questions requires of us, indeed forces us, to recognize the importance of the doctrine of the Spirit. Will this lead to giving it a place of central importance?

I. Starting from transcendental theology, which from the 1920's has given a great impulse to theology, I will now orient myself by reference to three great figures: Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Gerrit Jan Heering, Professor at the Remonstrant Seminary, Leyden, 1917–49.

Barth discusses the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in his chapter, The Revelation of God.[2] Jesus Christ, he says, is the objective reality of the revelation, who from this reality becomes the objective possibility of the revelation. Behind this stands God's freedom with respect to man. This objective reality and possibility being extant, the descent of the Holy Spirit may take place as the subjective reality of the revelation, from which the subjective possibility for man proceeds. Behind this lies man's freedom with respect to God. Through the descent of the Holy Spirit man receives his existence, that is to say, man is so gripped and changed by it, that he receives his existence only from the revelation. The important thing is that this subjective reality of the revelation is quite dependent upon the objective reality (Jesus Christ); so dependent that the subjective reality (Holy Spirit) is altogether enclosed within the objective.

This means that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is hemmed in by Christology and cannot force a way out. The peculiar character of the Spirit consists only in this, that in the revelation it makes audible the Word of God. But the Word of God is the Lord Jesus Christ, so that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which seems to be independent, has once more been absorbed into the circle of Christology. Notice, too, that all this has validity only within the

[2] Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, I.2.Par.16. Zurich, 1945.

Church; but we must specially bear in mind that the Holy Spirit's point of impact is upon individual personality.

With Brunner things are different.[3] For him Pneumatology is not imprisoned within Christology, but presupposes it. He states it thus: man's existence and end is determined by God's work; the issue is the meeting between God Himself and man. There are three levels on which this work and meeting are to be found: on the level of Creation (God, Creator and Father); of Redemption (Christ); and of Regeneration (Holy Spirit). This corresponds with our three-dimensional existence in time — past, present and future. The doctrine concerning Christ (redemption in the present) would lose its meaning without the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Christ brings into our lives the new 'whence' (Woher) after the first 'whence?' is answered by our creation. This new 'whence' has its reality in the fact that we have come from God's infinite love. Thus my past as a creature is annulled and restored. But my existence has now to be directed towards the future, otherwise life is like a film which shows a man jumping but who is suddenly suspended in mid-air. To anticipate the future and to direct man towards it, is the work of the Holy Spirit. Regeneration by the Holy Spirit makes us participate in God's Sonship in advance (Rom. viii 14). And only when this happens does the present (Christ's redemptive work) acquire meaning. This is the direct work of the Holy Spirit in and for the personality, and may issue in a community, the religious community. Then what happens? Again Christ is central to the community, and Christology becomes the starting-point after the work of the Holy Spirit is accomplished. The important point is that here, too, Christology is central, though Pneumatology is not enclosed within it, but has a function of its own. Yet it is tested and realized by Christology which remains the norm for the Spirit. This latter may be the confessional element, but not the critical element. Christ remains the norm for the Holy Spirit. And again we must bear in mind that here too the impact of the Holy Spirit takes place within the personality.

The third point of orientation is G. J. Heering, whose theology

[3] Vom Werk des Heiligen Geistes. (Concerning the Work of the Holy Spirit.) Three Lectures to the University of Copenhagen, p. 10. Zurich, 1934.

is more open, dynamic and mobile. The Spirit of God is equated with the Spirit of Christ, who is in turn equated with the Holy Spirit.[4] These three form one strong identity. The Spirit is the continuous stream flowing in the process of revelation, and has both a divine and a human aspect. As Holy Spirit it is the revelation of God in man, and is also received as such by man through faith. We possess this Holy Spirit in our faith. It is God's gift to us. Christ, the historical revelation, becomes a personal revelation in and through the Spirit. The Holy Spirit connects God's Spirit with that of man, and operates where revelation and faith meet each other. The Holy Spirit is God's living connection between revelation and faith, not to be conceived of, however, without Christ. He possessed the Spirit in reality; we possess it only in faith. Through religious man this divine revelation can issue in the religious community. This happened at Pentecost where the ecstatic-prophetic found an historical culminating point. For Heering, too, Christ and Christology take a central place. The Holy Spirit flows through Christ into man whose entire, or religious, personality being involved, is awakened by it.

Summing up, we find in these three dogmatists one point of agreement: it is in the human personality, the individual life of man, that the impact with the Holy Spirit takes place. With Barth this occurs only within the Church; with Brunner it happens within the personality and issues in the Church; with Heering the Spirit flows into the Church or congregation through those who believe in Christ and therefore in God's holy love. These three theologians differ, among other things, in their conception of the religious community, but they correspond in the direct connection they find between the Holy Spirit and the human personality. In all three this direct involvement of the personality is central.

II. In order to advance we must now orient ourselves by the Scriptural data. Besides doctrine, the New Testament contains the Gospel story, a reflection of what was lived and preached in the Christian community concerning the relation between Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. We may start from this, that

[4] Geloof en Openbaring (Faith and Revelation), pp. 173 ff. Arnhem, 1950.

in all four Gospels Jesus Christ stands as the bearer of the Spirit, who therefore only seldom operates directly. When Jesus leaves the world, however, the nature and operation of the Spirit will become evident. According to their canonical order, the line we are now tracing through the Gospels ends with St. John where Jesus, having appeared to his disciples after death, endows them with the Holy Spirit (John xx 22). Towards the close of the Synoptic Gospels we read of personal appearances: to the Marys, after which Jesus commands his disciples to teach all nations (Matthew xxviii 19 f.); in St. Mark's account the injunction is to preach the Gospel to the whole creation (Mark xvi 15) and, anticipating our theme, believers "shall speak with new tongues" (Mark xvi 17). After the appearances to the women and the travellers to Emmaus, in St. Luke's Gospel, the injunction to preach is followed by an instruction to wait for an enduement of power "from on high" (Luke xxiv 49). We must also bear in mind that in Luke i 17 'spirit' and 'power' appear together. Finally, in St. John's Gospel, Jesus bestows the gift of the Holy Spirit upon his disciples. There are personal appearances to Mary, and later to Thomas, besides that at which ten disciples are present and receive a sacramental command concerning the remission and retaining of sins (John xx 23). This action is reminiscent of the Day of Atonement.

It is important to notice that the action of the Holy Spirit in the Gospel stories differs from the expositions of the dogmatists for whom the impact of the Holy Spirit occurs within the individual person. In the Gospels, personal meeting with Jesus occurs during his life or after the crucifixion, but the Holy Spirit comes to the group, the circle of disciples. After washing their feet Jesus explains to the Twelve that the Paraclete will come to them all together, will teach them, bring to mind Christ's words and lead them into all truth (John xiv 26; xvi 13). The personal element, therefore, lies in the contact with the person of Jesus Christ; the Holy Spirit is the binding element in the group or circle.

This standpoint is expressed in other New Testament books, but here we shall look only at The Acts of the Apostles. There Peter stands in the circle. His first work is to complete the

Twelve again. He is the central figure at Pentecost, and when the Holy Spirit descends upon them he speaks as the representative of the circle. But to St. Paul, who journeys alone to Damascus, it is not the Holy Spirit who comes, but Jesus who appears to him in person: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" "Who art thou Lord?" "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest."

We must not, therefore, draw a line from the historical revelation or objective reality of Jesus Christ to the personal revelation or subjective reality of the Holy Spirit. It is not like this in the New Testament. In the Gospel stories the line runs from personal contact with Jesus Christ to the gift of the Spirit, of which He was the bearer. The circle then becomes the bearer. Starting from the congregation, as first given historical reality, the line runs from the community in the Holy Spirit to Jesus Christ. He is second; the Holy Spirit is first. In my opinion J. E. Fison states it rightly in his book, The Blessing of the Holy Spirit. Discussing the words 'holy' and 'spirit' in the Bible he points out that 'holy' is strongly emphasized in the Old Testament, and proceeds to show — following G. K. Barrett's The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition (S.P.C.K. 1947) — that there is a great change in the New Testament. There *hagios*, like *pneuma*, is a dangerous word and needs reinterpreting before it can be safely used. For the New Testament writers "the spirit is primary and holy is secondary. They saw more danger in a perverted and static and defensive religion of holiness than in an eccentric and twisted but dynamic and aggressive religion of the spirit." The important thing about the first Christian congregations was that they were communities of the Spirit! But then the two freshly-handled words 'holy' and 'spirit' are combined. Upon this pivot everything turns. *For the New Testament writers the conception of the Holy Spirit was the central idea.* "In the novel combination of both words, holy and spirit, they characterized the uniqueness of the new religion." [5] This means that the doctrine of the Spirit should have priority. It is true that Fison, after drawing this conclusion from his study of the New Testament, still arrives in a roundabout way at a theology which makes Christology its starting-point. He is, perhaps, too tightly bound by rigid church tradition;

[5] The Blessing of the Holy Spirit. J. E. Fison, p. 109.

but we must keep in mind the point that pneumatology should be given priority, for it leads us to that spirit which is the binding element of the circle, and also its *critical* element!

III. In order to show this we must note briefly the function and nature of the Holy Spirit. St. John's Gospel, the Gospel of the endowment of the Spirit, describes the function against a transcendental background. "When the Paraclete has come whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth, which issues from the Father, he will bear witness as to what I am" (John xv 26; translation, E. V. Rieu). The first part indicates that the relation is going to be established by God; the second that it will be contact with a group to whom witness will be borne as to what Jesus was. This will happen in three different ways. The Holy Spirit will *teach* the disciples; will *call to their minds all that Jesus has said to them*, and then *lead them into all truth* (John xiv 26 and xvi 13). Teach them! From what? Recall to their minds! From what source? Lead them on their way! Through what wood? These words are St. John's version of Matthew's words at the end of the parables (Matthew xiii 52): "A Doctor of the Law, a scribe, has only to be schooled in the Kingdom of Heaven to be like a householder with a store of treasures new and old at his disposal" (translation E. V. Rieu).

What is this 'store of treasures'? What is the source from which, according to John, the Holy Spirit will teach and bring all to mind again? What is the wood through which he will guide the way? What if it should be the Holy Scriptures? Or more exactly, the written and unwritten tradition? — that is to say, both the Scriptures and the living tradition which is ever reforming and renewing itself, and from which the Scriptures themselves have also sprung? The disciples lived with and from the Old Testament. St. Luke, among others, gives clear proof of this. He makes the unknown companion on the Emmaus road (xxiv 27 44), who later turns out to be Jesus, expound the Scriptures. Whatever passages were chosen are seen in relation to Christ. In Acts viii 26 Philip is guided to the eunuch's chariot, and from the passage in Isaiah, the evangelist begins to preach Jesus. Thus the Holy Spirit will operate in the circle of the disciples, teaching them to read the Scriptures with new eyes. To this new reading they

will testify. Indeed, does not the last chapter of Mark say that "they shall speak with new tongues?" (xvi 17).

Here a detailed inquiry should be made into the speaking with tongues (glossolalia) recorded in Acts ii and 1 Corinthians xiv–xvi, but it is impossible here. Yet I shall not pass it by completely. Look at the story of Pentecost which we customarily see in the light of an ecstatic exaltation. The account is confused and confusing. The sound "as of a rushing mighty wind" and tongues "like as of fire" fascinate us and lead us to the thought of ecstasy so that too little attention is paid to *what was spoken with tongues.* We are told that the speech referred to "the wonderful works of God" (v 11). It is not difficult to see the correspondence between the phenomena of Pentecost and the winds and fire which operate, according to Psalm civ 4, as God's angels and ministers. This Psalm belongs to the group (ciii–cvii) which praises the Lord for His great works in creation and history. The important thing in Acts is not wind and fire, but that a time has come when once again God sends His messengers and ministers, filled with the Holy Spirit which makes them speak with tongues. *Glossa* may mean 'tongue' or 'language', and also "a word or a part of Scripture (mostly old), which requires exposition, an altered or new exposition given by commentators." Then the word 'glossa' begins to mean the explanation itself: an explanation which, written in the margin as a comment upon the text, was left there but gradually became incorporated into the text. Thus the Scriptures grew, handed down by oral tradition, absorbing ever more elements. Thus in particular did those scriptures grow, which were to be stamped by religious authorities as Holy Scriptures. The classic glossators of the Alexandrian School were famous. The leaders of Temple and Synagogue, the Scribes and Doctors of the Law, but also the leaders of sects, joined in their own ways the group of acknowledged or unacknowledged glossators who worked in the field of Holy Scripture. Psalm 1, which is an introduction to all the Psalms, calls that man blessed who does not sit in the circle of scoffers but meditates in God's law "day and night." "For the Lord knoweth the way of the righteous: but the way of the ungodly shall perish" (v 6). And the way to be followed, along

which the great works of God could be seen, led through a definite choice of passages (pericopes) from the Old Testament.

In their interpretation the schools might differ; tradition had all but established the route, and in general there was little difference in their explanations. We shall be led astray through rendering 'glossai' too easily as 'languages'. In the story of Pentecost 'languages' are called 'dialectoi'. Clearer insight is obtained when we translate 'glossai' as 'pericopes', chosen passages of Scripture — with or without a commentary.

Now the substantive 'glossa' is connected with the verb 'lalein,' and the ecstatic element is suddenly introduced here: 'glossolalia.' But 'lalein' does not mean to speak in a confusing manner: it nearly always means to speak in an ordinary way, and is sometimes related to the adverb 'orthos,' orderly (cf. Mark vii 35). This is contrary to what is suggested by the story of Pentecost. The 'glossai" form the contents of what is spoken as in Ephesians v 19: "Speak to yourselves in Psalms," which means the reciting of psalms, singing or half-singing. This was done during public worship and contained the teaching of Holy Scripture.

Those acquainted with the East or the world of Islam know the place occupied by the recitation of Holy Scripture, and for what lengths of time it may be sustained. The recitation may sometimes be monotonous or expressed in the manner of an incantation, but that is quite different from what we understand by the ecstatic declarations under the power of the Spirit at Pentecost. What matters is to see that 'speaking with tongues' formed a usual part of public worship, namely, the reading or reciting aloud of fixed passages of Scripture whose order was according to tradition.

What happened then at Pentecost? Evidently something so radically different that "they were all amazed, and were in doubt, saying one to another, What meaneth this?" (Acts ii 12). Verse 4 says that they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other 'glossai' as the spirit gave them utterance. 'Heteros' (other) means 'contrary' in most instances, rather than 'something different.' Galatians i 6 speaks about "another Gospel." St. Paul does not mean merely a divergent Gospel, but one which is contrary to the Gospel of Christ. 'Heteros' is a definite thing,

intentionally chosen and set over against what was given before. Thus 'other tongues' are pericopes different from those given by tradition.

In the midst of the many devout Jews "out of every nation under heaven" who were in Jerusalem at the time, different dialects were spoken by the disciples, or rather by all those who were "with one accord in one place," probably the 120 mentioned in Acts i 15. Those who might be supposed to speak the Galilean dialect of Aramaic now spoke all kinds of Aramaic dialects such as were spoken in Jerusalem by Jews "out of every nation." This remarkable thing confounded the multitude, but when people became conscious of what was really happening they recognized that the one hundred and twenty were proclaiming the wonderful works of God — "in our 'glossai' " they say to each other (ii 11); in 'glossai' from our Scriptures. But they are not the pericopes expected on this feast-day; they are different from those prescribed by tradition. The interpretation given by the disciples is so foolish that men could only scoff at them and accuse them of drunkenness. But we recognize in the event the word stated in Mark xvi 17 that those who believe "shall speak with new tongues." This is the reciting of pericopes as is customary in public worship, certainly on feast-days, but the radical change is that the disciples either chose pericopes other than the familiar ones, or interpreted them differently. We need not be long in doubt as to the purport of this new and contrary interpretation: the pericopes were expounded in such a way as to point to Jesus. This, and the reaction of the multitude, caused such confusion that Peter, with the eleven, rises, intervenes and delivers an address comprising three 'glossai' or pericopes: one from the prophet Joel and two from the Psalms. His exposition points so convincingly to Jesus that those present "were pricked in their heart" and said, "What shall we do?" This 'glossolalia' of Peter was no ecstatic talk; it was decisive expository preaching. About three thousand were baptized the same day with the promise that they too should receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, enabling them to understand the Scriptures in this new, convincing and moving way. This was the work of the Holy Spirit, and rendered the new sect dangerous and insufferable. For it is a dangerous thing to put the Holy Spirit above Holy

Scripture and the official Divine Service, and for men themselves to act as 'angels and ministers' of God. Only expulsion could follow this.

In this light we may now understand the scene in Luke iv 14–30 where Jesus returns to Galilee and visits the Nazareth synagogue on the sabbath day. He reads a pericope from Isaiah but interprets it in a way which could not be accepted. At first the congregation listens with approbation, but when unexpectedly he interprets a passage from 1 Kings xviii about Elijah as concerning himself, the mood of his audience turns against him. Such interpretation is not permissible. The angry people drive him out with the intention of hurling him off the prominence on which their city stood. That, indeed, would be the fate of those who combined the two dangerous words 'holy' and 'spirit,' and proclaimed this to be the uniqueness of their religion.

IV. Has what has been said been a long discourse in Biblical Theology? This theology must at least give us guidance concerning the doctrine of the Spirit. I have given it this ample space only in order that we may see the way we must take. Our starting-point is that the Holy Spirit is the binding and testing element, the confessional and critical element, combining for disciples the right way. It is the great task of our congregations to gather people who want to think, to use their wills and to live under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

In the Gospel story the moment arrives in which Jesus endows His disciples with the Holy Spirit. When, in our public worship, we have heard the Gospel of which Jesus Christ is the centre, and have lived through it with Him, there comes the moment when we, too, are sent forth once more into the world. There the Holy Spirit will guide us and help us to adopt a critical attitude towards this life and the world. But when we return and are again confronted with the preaching of the Gospel, still guided by the Spirit we shall adopt an attitude of religious criticism, a constructive attitude towards the conception of Christ that is preached to us. If we owe our conception of God to Jesus Christ and, in a beautiful metaphor, His Gospel is the great window through which we may see God in His truth,[6] then the Holy Spirit is the Spirit

[6] Geloof en Openbaring. C. J. Heering, p. 283.

of the house in whose wall the window is placed. That is to say: we approach the conception of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit. Viewed in this way, the value of the study of the life of Jesus will be enhanced. Indeed, it is necessary that we prepare ourselves and that we seek to submit our own spirit and thought to the pressure of the Holy Spirit, to be imbued by it, so that the Paraclete may *teach* us, *call everything to our minds*, and *guide* us. Indeed, we may pray: *Veni Creator Spiritus*.

It seems to me that there is great confusion in the Christological questions studied today, and that these studies are the weak point of the Ecumenical Movement, the rock on which it might split. It stands in the midst of increasingly complicated questions of theology, and will not be able to concern itself with much more than the problems of Christology. Our task seems to be, therefore, to help to prevent it from ending in a blind alley or morass of dogmatism, and ever to affirm that the heart of Christology is compassion. It is incumbent upon us, then, to make the doctrine of the Spirit central. I should also be inclined to say: *The first half of the twentieth century was a time of Christology: the second half will have to be a time for Pneumatology, the Doctrine of the Spirit*. This will entail hard work in the fields of Biblical Theology, Psychology and the Philosophy of Religion, and equally hard work in the domain of Dogmatics.

Let me finally advance three brief but urgent points:

1. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Truth which will lead us inexorably to the truth concerning the great deeds of God, even though it may lead us upon a track other than the one we follow through a traditional and over-simplified Biblical Theology.

2. The Holy Spirit is Love (agape). 1 Corinthians xiii is the link between chapters xii and xiv, speaking, as it does, in 'glossai,' and by affirming that 'glossolalia' is altogether determined by love. Romans v 5 also speaks about that love of God which is "shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given to us."

3. The world (and we ourselves are part of the world) will ask for the fruits of the Holy Spirit, and rightly so. The language of our ethics is insufficiently clear because our ethics themselves are inwardly uncertain, yet we shall be judged by our fruits. Should

this be called pragmatism? Even this judgment may be of the Holy Spirit, and the Gospel's injunction still stands: "Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them!" (Matthew vii 20).

Is the Doctrine of the Spirit the Cinderella of Theology? Cinderella is waiting, but not for a witch. She does not ask to be permitted to dance with the others for a while, nor even to dance with the Prince. She is waiting for Prince Theology to wed her.

THE FOURTH CENTURY GREEK FATHERS AS EXEGETES[1]

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Not long ago, an English New Testament teacher was pressed by a Russian theologian for a straight answer to the question, "Do you teach your students to interpret the New Testament according to the Fathers?" The answer could hardly be Yes. In most Western Universities it would be rare to find references to patristic exegesis in lectures on the Old or New Testaments. So a chasm was disclosed between academic theology as it is understood in the Eastern Orthodox world and its counterpart in the West. It is as big a chasm as any that gapes, doctrinally or ecclesiastically, between the Western Christian denominations and the various branches of the Eastern Church. For the Orthodox, patristic exegesis affords a sure safeguard of right Christian belief, so that the task of the academic theologian is to teach that exegesis. He is not so readily concerned about the primary meaning of the text of Scripture; that is to say, about the meaning it had in the minds of the writers, and that they looked for it to have for their immediate readers. Dr. Zankov, speaking for the Greek Orthodox Church, says, "The Holy Scriptures serve us as a source. The liturgical books, and writings of the Church Fathers, are, so to speak, the rule and line of ecclesiastical consciousness. In both of these the heart and spirit of Orthodoxy are reflected."[2] This Orthodox concept of Scripture has roots that run back to the first days of Greek Christianity. The question of Scripture had already begun to concern the Christian community in New Testament times. In the New Testament itself we see Christians addressing themselves, for guidance and

[1] This article resumes the substance of the Ethel M. Wood Lecture, 1956, in the University of London.

[2] S. Zankov. The Eastern Orthodox Church (trans. A. Lowrie, S.C.M. Press. 1929).

edification to the scriptures of the Old Testament. In the mid-second century, Marcion challenged the right of those scriptures to such regard. When the crisis which he precipitated had passed, the future of Christianity lay with the congregations that held the Jewish Holy Scriptures to be a revelation of the God and Father of Jesus Christ. In few of these congregations could those scriptures be read in their original tongue. But the Jews themselves had produced a Greek version known as the Septuagint, and this it was that the Greek Christian congregations received and used as Holy Scripture. By the end of the second century, those congregations were giving a like recognition to most of the writings forming our New Testament, and the dual collection of sacred writings in Greek which resulted formed the exclusive matter for reading in the liturgical gatherings. Before long the preaching of the clergy came to be chiefly exposition of these writings, and the Greek Bible, thus constituted, was being rendered into other tongues with the expansion of the Church. So Irenaeus of Lyons, whom von Harnack dubbed "the first of the old catholic Fathers," can equally be described by Reinhold Seeberg as "a biblicist, and the first great exponent of Christian biblicism." Church and Bible had, in short, entered into a specific relationship. For a century after Irenaeus, the Bible in the hands of the Church was generally regarded as the unequivocal means of her guidance into all truth. The first set-back to this expectation took place at the synod of Nicaea. There proved to be rival interpretations of many passages of Scripture considered decisive for the question at issue. No way could be found to a secure formulation of Christian orthodoxy except by going outside the language of Scripture. The Church thus experienced the need not merely to say which exegesis was right, but also to find a criterion by which to know which interpretation must be the true one. Accordingly, in 431, at the synod of Ephesus, Cyril of Alexandria proposed that "that interpretation of Scripture should prevail which was found in the received Fathers and ancient exegetes." [3] This is the criterion by which Eastern Orthodoxy

[3] The words of this summary are taken from the Canon of 1571 directing the content of the preaching of Anglican clergy. The Church of England then stood closer to the Easterns in this matter.

has been guided ever since. And no honored patristic names come more readily to the lips of the Orthodox than those of the Greek Fathers of the fourth century.

These fourth-century Greek Fathers form a compact section of the patristic field. They were religious leaders in a world that was rapidly becoming Christian. They expounded a Bible written in the language in which they habitually spoke and thought. And they regarded the writings of the Old and New Testaments as one literature of one people of God, evolving from the dawn of human history under inspiration of one divine Spirit. The combination of these three characteristics thus marks out the fourth century Greek Fathers as a group within the patristic field. They were also children of their age. It was the age of the Second Sophistic, in which rhetoric had such a vogue as never before or since. It was a rhetoric of popularization, which strove to take the different lines of philosophic thought handed down from classical antiquity, and harmonize them to yield plausible answers to all questions that interested the men of their own age. There was no attempt at the radical rethinking of old problems. The answers to all questions were supposed to be implicit in the heritage from the past, so that the sophist's task was to make those answers convincing to his contemporaries. We could have no more striking indication, albeit an unconscious one, of this emphasis on rhetoric, than in one of the fourth century Greek Fathers, Gregory of Nyssa. At the end of c.8 of his work On the Creation of Man, he enlarges on the difference between the construction of the human mouth and the mouths of animals. Man's mouth, he argues, is comparatively inefficient as an organ for devouring food, since so much has been sacrificed to its efficiency as the organ of speech. The unique character of human hands, Gregory continues, both helps the mouth in dealing with food and enables speech to be reduced to writing. This passage from a Christian exegete shows that the sophistic fashion of thought was dominant inside as well as outside the Christian communities. It is not surprising, therefore, if fourth century exegesis often consisted of drawing plausible answers from biblical data to the questions of the moment.

The age was also one whose leading social and political task

was the integration of the ecclesiastical order into the structure of the Roman empire. It was this that made doctrinal differences among Christians so inopportune, and concentrated the efforts of exegetes upon polemical uses of Scripture. As Bishop Chase of Ely said, "Controversy always impoverishes, not least when it is the ruling instinct of an interpreter of the Bible." Something of this is to be observed in our fourth century Greek Fathers. No exegete of this period could remain unaffected by the reaction that went on progressively through the century, caused by the excesses of the arch-exegete of the previous century, Origen. This reaction was only the negative aspect of the great and continuing influence which he still exercised. At the beginning of the century it was unchallenged. Athanasius could open his Contra Gentes with the simple affirmation that teachers in the past have shown us how to interpret the Scriptures. It appears as he goes on that Irenaeus and Origen stand first among these teachers. But some of Origen's doctrines caused growing uneasiness, with the result that his Biblical commentaries, which had had so great a vogue, came under suspicion. Already they had lost some prestige on account of their excessive allegorism. Reaction against this seems to have started with Paul of Samosata only a decade after Origen's death. Criticism on this ground, however, spread slowly. Congregations did not change their ideas in this respect so quickly as the more learned, and preachers were themselves affected by their knowledge that the people were used to Origen's exegesis. We may see this exemplified by Cyril of Jerusalem, while delivering, in 350, his second Catechetical Lecture and explaining to the candidates for baptism the nature of their spiritual foe. He does this by reference to Ezekiel, 28, 12–18, the "Lamentation over the Prince of Tyre." Now Origen, in his Commentary on Ezekiel, takes this passage as a revelation of the history of Lucifer; in spite of the difficulty of applying to an archangel the words "Wilt thou yet say, before him that slayeth thee, I am a god? But thou shalt be a man, and no god, in the hand of him that slayeth thee." Cyril both accepts this interpretation of the passage and expects his hearers to follow it. There was, no doubt, a copy of Origen's Commentary on Ezekiel in the church library at Jerusalem which may have influenced preaching in Jerusalem

for long before Cyril. Another witness to the influence of this passage of Origen is Athanasius, in his Second Letter to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, written in 359 or 360, where he says, in section 4, that the words "Thou art a man and not god" were addressed to an archangel. Not thirty years later, however, Chrysostom says bluntly that the reference must be to a man. But then Chrysostom, like Paul of Samosata, belonged to Antioch, and all Syrians tended to look for the literal meaning of the text of Scripture, and to eschew allegorism. Not that there was, even in Syria, any repudiation of allegorism. Dr. Spanneut has shown this in his Recherches sur les écrits d'Eustathe d'Antioche (p. 62). Eustathius wrote a reply to Origen's work on the Witch of Endor. It is known as De Engastrimytho, and contains bitter raillery at Origen's allegoristic extravagances. Yet Eustathius praises a work which Methodius of Olympus wrote on the same subject, in spite of Methodius' being a thorough-going allegorist. Extant fragments of Eustathius show him using typological interpretations himself. There was, of course, good reason why no one should explicitly condemn allegoristic interpretation as such. Eusebius of Emesa says that since St. Paul allegorizes, the Christian exegete cannot rule out allegorism, though it should not be used to excess. This is in a sermon on the barren fig-tree.[4] There was, he says, an allegorical interpretation in which the barren fig-tree is Jerusalem. But this must be wrong, he holds, since it is evident that God did not make Jerusalem fruitless for ever. With an apology to past exegetes, Eusebius then interprets both Christ's words and the withering of the fig-tree in immediate relation to the circumstances of that hour in history. Basil the Great, although he might be called the spiritual grandchild of Origen through Gregory Thaumaturgus, has, in the opening of his 9th Homily on the Six Days of Creation, a more biting criticism of allegorism than Eusebius. Allegorists, he says, bring forth their own ideas under a pretext of exegesis, "believing themselves wiser than the Holy Spirit." This was, perhaps, to protest too much. The protester was not always for the literal meaning only. In the 4th Homily of this

[4] E. M. Buytaert, Études sur Eusebe d'Emèse, Discours conservés en Latin, Collection de Troyes. Louvain, 1953. M. Spanneut's book was published at Lille in 1948.

series, he declares that "Everywhere, in mystic language, history is sown with the dogmas of theology."

The stronghold of allegorism was those passages of Scripture which seem morally unacceptable. This stronghold began to fall when Chrysostom propounded the view that God's purpose to communicate His mind to men makes Him stoop, in Scripture, to meet them on their own level. Any passage in the Bible, he says, can be received according to its plain and literal meaning; since, if there is in it anything unworthy of God, that element is due to man, who must thus be stooped to, shamefully, before he can be made to understand.[5]

Here, then, in these later Antiochenes, Diodore, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nemesius of Emesa, we meet with an approach to the Bible more like that of modern biblical scholarship than is ever to be met again in the centuries that followed.

The thing very largely owed to Origen which continued to be accepted in the fourth century, was the belief in one divine purpose over-ruling the whole content of the Bible, so that the words of one author may be combined with the words of another to convey a truth not to be gathered from either passage taken by itself, but only from the two when taken together. And these Christian rhetors in the tradition of the Second Sophistic came to view the Bible as an oration of the divine Rhetor, full of subtle cross-allusions which only an exegete of rhetorical subtlety could detect and interpret. The consequences for the exegesis of the period may best be shown by an illustration.

In the Second Letter of Athanasius to Serapion "on the Holy Spirit" we find him combining two texts of which we should say that they are wholly unrelated. He cites Isaiah 45.14, of which the Septuagint runs "They shall make supplication unto Thee, saying, God is in Thee, and there is no God but Thee." "Who is this God *in* whom God is?" asks Athanasius, and answers himself from John 14.11, "Believe Me that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me." By this combination of texts, Athanasius thinks to establish the consubstantiality of the Son!

There is indeed very much fourth century exegesis on this level,

[5] See F. H. Chase, Chrysostom, a study in the history of Biblical interpretation. Cambridge, 1887, pp. 41–47.

and quite unacceptable in the eyes of a modern exegete, but it would be a mistake to suppose that it contained nothing worthy of such a person's attention. Old Testament scholars may have little to learn from these Greeks about the original meaning of any Old Testament passage. Yet they sometimes have things to say, even about the Old Testament, that are worth saying. Here [6] is Chrysostom, on God's calling Adam in the garden (Genesis 3.9). The Hebrew only says "Where art thou?" but the Septuagint says "Adam, where art thou?" Chrysostom, of course, follows the Septuagint. It would be preposterous, he says, to think that God needed Adam to show himself. God addressed him by name because, since last He spoke to him, his tragic sin had taken place, and he was awaiting in terror the descent of God's righteous anger. He called him by his personal name, because that goes with the tenderness of intimacy. To a mourner who yearns over the beloved, his name comes as the expression of his yearning. As David cried upon Absalom, so now God utters the name of this poor fallen child of His love, Adam. By the uttering of the name, the dread of implacable anger was dispelled, and only the sorrow of penitence remained. And then the words "Where art thou?" called Adam to measure for himself the depth of his fall.

So comments Chrysostom, and no doubt Hebraists would say that there is no ground for reading any of this into the mind of the Hebrew poet of Genesis. And yet this comment of Chrysostom is itself sacred poetry and inspired by the Genesis original. Perhaps Chrysostom may be judged more soundly exegetical when he explains the defeatist form of Jeremiah's prophecies.[7] Zedekiah, says Chrysostom, had sworn loyalty to Nebuchadnezzar by the God of Israel, and then forsworn himself by conspiring with Egypt. The prophet knew thenceforth that Jerusalem was doomed.

If this is an insight, as it seems to be, it came of Chrysostom's feeling himself to be standing in Jeremiah's shoes. Chrysostom believed that the rash and unnecessary swearing of oaths was a besetting sin of his fellow-citizens of Antioch, and had brought on the city the calamities of that Lenten season of 387. Thus the

[6] Hom. in Stat., viii. 6.
[7] Hom. in Stat., xix. 9.

plight of Jeremiah after the king's broken oath came home to Chrysostom with all the force of a personal message.

We may look more hopefully to these Greeks for light on the New Testament. They lived closer to the world of the New Testament writers than we do. It was a world in which angels and the supernatural were not regarded as dubious subjects, as they might be now. The story of Mary Magdalene at the Sepulchre (John 20), for example, had for them an atmosphere that held no hint of fantasy or unreality, and they may therefore have taken nuances which the evangelist intended and we may miss. Here are Chrysostom's observations on the passage.[8] It was of the Lord's tenderness to Mary, he says, that the angels in the tomb were not terrifying but seemed to her like friendly human beings. It was meet, reflects Chrysostom, to lead gently one of such lowly mind. So the angels helped Mary to understand what her distracted wits had failed to read of the message of the grave clothes. But as they speak, she is aware that their gaze has lighted upon some sight behind her, and she turns round. What she sees (for again she is being gently led) is a mere labouring man, to whom she says "If *thou* has borne Him hence, tell me where thou hast laid Him, and I will take Him away." When he did not reply, she turned back to the young men in the tomb. Then Jesus spoke her name in tones of reproof, and at last the truth breaks upon her. But her mind is all in a confusion of past with present, and she has to be checked with a "Touch Me not."

Evidently, for Chrysostom, the whole scene was of one piece with experiences that come to holy people, and made vivid and coherent sense. And who can question the probability of it's being close to the sense that the evangelist meant to convey?

A more complex example of fourth century nearness to the primitive Christian community may be seen in the comments of Cyril of Jerusalem and Epiphanius of Salamis on Matthew 27.51–3, the passage that tells of an earthquake at the hour of Christ's passion. "The rocks rent; and the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after His resurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appeared unto many." These *revenants* were recognized in

[8] Hom. LXXXVI in Johannem.

Jerusalem as 'saints.' We may suppose this title to designate such people as Simeon and Anna, now dead. Epiphanius, who was very well acquainted with Jerusalem, says in Panarion, III.1.75, (P. G. XLII 513D) that these saints haunted the earthly Jerusalem during the forty days after Christ's resurrection, and at His ascension entered, in His train, the heavenly Jerusalem. They were, he says in I.3.42 (XLI 800A), an earnest of the swallowing up of death in victory. In I.3.46 (XLI 844 ff.), defending belief in Adam's salvation, Epiphanius says that Adam was buried at Golgotha, which is called Calvary because of the presence of his skull; and that the water and blood from the cross flowed down upon his bones as if to say "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead." Accordingly Epiphanius sees in our Matthew passage part of the testimony that the elect waiting in Sheol felt power go forth from the passion of Christ to draw them to resurrection. Cyril of Jerusalem, lecturing in the basilica that Constantine built on Golgotha, was specially interested in the rending of the rocks described in Matthew, for the reason, as he tells us in Lecture XIII. 39, that there was still a visible cleft in the rock of Golgotha which was believed to remain from the rending of the rocks at the moment of Christ's death. He quotes Jonah 2.6 (I went down to the chasms of the mountains) in Lecture XIV. 20 as a prophecy of the passion and descent to Hades.

Rufinus, who towards the close of the fourth century was resident in the environs of Jerusalem, is a third witness to the continued interest at Jerusalem in the cleft rock of Golgotha. This appears in his Church History, IX. 6. He was, for the most part, simply translating Eusebius, who, at this point, tells how Maximin forged "Acts of Pilate" to discredit Christianity. Rufinus had an argument, which he now inserts, in the guise of a speech of the martyr Lucian defending himself before Maximin in 312, that the truth of the Gospels is vouched for by enduring witnesses. It is a favorite theme also with Cyril of Jerusalem. Rufinus' witnesses are the tomb, the cleft rock, and the sun that suffered eclipse. Unfortunately for Rufinus, in 312, the tomb's witness was muted, since, at that time, the rock of the tomb was buried under an earth mound surmounted by a shrine of Venus. Thus all that

can be founded upon this supposed speech of Lucian is this interest in the cleft rock (though the cleft was explained, for Rufinus, by the weight of the cross) thirty or more years later than Cyril's lectures. The earlier explanation depends upon belief that the soul of Christ, severed in death from His body (which, by miracle, remained uncorrupt), went down to Sheol, not by the common way, but through the rending rock. Thus we seem to have before us a Jerusalem tradition that Christ's passion fulfilled itself in a "harrowing of hell." Professor R. H. Lightfoot suggested that our Matthaean passage might be a reading back to the time of the passion of accepted eschatological signs. It could be the other way round. Some Christian eschatological ideas might be the reflection of the assurance felt by the primitive community that, by Christ's passion, death was swallowed up in victory. Thus the Jerusalem tradition may tell us what the evangelist meant in Matthew 27.51–53. The form of the tradition gains support, as by allusions and developments, in I Peter 3.14 and 4.6, Ignatius to the Magnesians 9, and John 5.25. The comment of J. B. Lightfoot on the Ignatian passage traces the notion that the saints of the past were gathered up into the triumph of Christ's resurrection, in Hermas, Marcion, Justin, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Hippolytus and Origen. He concludes, "It is speaking testimony to the hold which the belief had on men's minds." An idea possessing such momentum may well have started on its way earlier even than Ignatius. In short, our fourth century Greek Fathers may have a truer notion of what 'St. Matthew' meant in this passage than later commentators.

We may see another example of the advantage that came of comparative nearness of circumstance to New Testament writers in Cyril of Jerusalem's understanding of I Corinthians 7.5, in the passage concerning temporary abstinence from marital relations for the sake of leisure for prayer (σχολάζειν τῇ προσευχῇ). Cyril assumes without question [9] that the prayer meant is liturgical prayer. He does not suppose the couple to have agreed first that they wanted to be freer for prayer, and then, as consequence, that they will make such and such changes in their domestic arrangements. He supposes that something external to the house-

[9] Lecture IV. 27.

hold, and arising from the liturgical life of the Church, is calling the married, together with all others, to a time of special prayer. For this the married will do well to make a specific but (as the apostle urges with some show of anxiety) temporary change in their domestic relations. Cyril might be guilty of an anachronism. He was a conscious and purposeful leader in what Dom Gregory Dix called "the hallowing of time" by the observance of holy seasons. On the other hand, the Pasch seems to have been observed in the Pauline churches, perhaps with some non-literal "abstinence from leaven." Evidence for the observance of "Stations" is very early. There is some ground for reading back into apostolic times the practice of calling the congregation to prayer and fasting when circumstances or the voice of prophecy gave reason for so doing. It is true that the liturgical life of the church of Aelia-Jerusalem in the fourth century was a long way down a stream of development that began in the days of I Corinthians, but it was a continuous stream. We must not, therefore, dismiss as anachronistic without further reason the possibility that the church of Corinth in its first days was wont, on some principle, to call the 'saints' to special times of prayer. And however much the Corinthian 'saints' were given to believing in their own inspiration, the religious individualism implied in a man and his wife being moved to hold a "Station" private to themselves is more conceivable in the Protestant West than in first century Corinth. So, when we read in Peake's Commentary the phrase "If they feel that they will be thus more undisturbed for prayer," we may place the anachronism there, and not with Cyril. And if we take St. Paul to be handling a situation created by what can be called liturgical observances, the passage loses nothing of point or coherence. It is needless to assemble the abundant evidence for belief, in the ancient world, that sacred occasions called for abstinence from sexual relations. The fact that religion then covered sexual license as well only shows that two stages of religious development were present in the world of that age. The higher of these was that in which continence was associated with the sacred. And the fact that the other stage was actual at the same time only strengthened, in the people of higher religious culture, the sentiment for continence. St. Paul must have known



very much Jewish witness to such a sentiment, and the Corinthians are likely themselves to have known it as represented in the Septuagint of Exodus 19.15 and I Samuel 21.4. This all seems to tell in favor of Cyril's exegesis.

But it would not give a fair picture if we covered up the fact that these Greek Fathers suffered from the provincialisms peculiar to the Greek world of their day. They had a naïve assurance that what they took for science must be exactly the key needed to unlock the meaning of Scripture. An illustration of this may be seen at the end of chapter 9 of the 5th Homily of Basil the Great on the Six Days of Creation. He has cited Jeremiah 17.6, where the prophet likens a man who puts his trust in man to the tamarisk. This is an apt comparison; for the tamarisk is a plant that can thrive on very little moisture, and so can win its ecological battle for salt marshes. Thus, Jeremiah thinks, it gets the second best out of life because it will not depend upon God, who gives the rain in its season. Basil cannot be content with anything so direct and simple. He goes to some plant-book and finds the tamarisk there classed as an aquatic plant, presumably because it is often washed by salt water. But the tamarisk also grows in the desert. So, by the rules of typology, the tamarisk, as having two habitats, must represent a double-minded man. So the man that puts his trust in man is to be identified with the double-minded man found in other parts of Scripture. It would be hard to find exegesis more wrong-headed and futile. And yet these homilies of Basil were much admired for just such scientific erudition. A somewhat different example may be taken from the opening of the Contra Gentes of Athanasius. Adam, says Athanasius, is described in the Bible as having his mind towards God, and as associated with 'the holy ones' in the contemplation of things perceived with the mind. Where, we may well ask, does the Bible say that? The answer, according to Athanasius, is Genesis 2.19; "The Lord God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air and brought them unto the man, to see what he would call them; and whatsoever the man called every living creature, that was the name thereof." We may suppose that the biblical author meant that man, as overlord of the

other creatures, was allowed to assign them their names. But it does not seem that Athanasius thought so. He thinks that Adam, who had not seen the creatures before they were presented to him, named them correctly at sight. For why? As Plato would have guessed, Adam had been contemplating the ideas of all the species as they existed in the intelligible world. Athanasius, we remember, had been brought up to attribute Plato's insights to 'leakage' among the Gentiles of the God-given wisdom of Moses. Accordingly, when such an explanation was obvious to a Platonist like Athanasius, it must, *a fortiori*, have been what Moses meant. If these examples of period-provincialism are gross in quality, they are, on the other hand, of no great consequence. There are things that might equally be put down to period-provincialism, of greater consequence. There is, for example, the conviction, shared preëminently by Eusebius of Emesa and Gregory of Nyssa among our fourth century Greeks, that the state of life based on physical virginity is the angelic efflorescence of our race, for the sake of which the whole stem and branches of mankind have come down through the ages. Eusebius will allow that the married may attain to everlasting salvation, but only "out of great tribulation." The unblemished crown is for virgins, and is within their grasp, even in this life.

These praisers of virginity could easily and without recourse to allegorism find many passages of Scripture to support their views. But do they hold the key to the meaning of the biblical writers, therein? The Franciscan Friar, E. M. Buytaert, who edits the Homilies of Eusebius of Emesa, recoils, as it were, from the virginity-doctrine of Eusebius, with the question "Is this really the meaning of the Christian message?" Upright as are Eusebius and Gregory in their exegetical methods, many will find this part of their exegesis profoundly unacceptable. The crucial question is whether the evangelists mean to depict Jesus as hero and model of the virgin life; or again whether St. Paul thought fornication the most fundamental of sins. In answering such questions, it is not so easy to be sure that we are altogether right and these Greek Fathers are altogether wrong. It remains, however, that if, in any average course of patristic reading, we were to note

down every piece of exegesis which, on purely exegetical grounds, is not to be taken seriously, we should quickly fill a note-book.

There are, however, clear dangers for biblical studies in an 'orthodoxy' of exegetical scholarship that disvalues almost all the exegesis of past Christian ages. There is the danger that they might shrink into academic criticism of an arbitrarily defined body of religious classics. This is clearly inappropriate. The Bible has not just been recovered from the sands of Egypt, but has reached us by unbroken tradition, in living and organic relation with a community-life; that of a Christian Church renewing itself from generation to generation. That community-life has been created and maintained by a religious faith and inspiration akin to that which forms the unifying principle which welds the diversity of scriptures into one Bible. The content of the scriptures transcends in quality what we may call the biblical thought to which all subsequent reading of the Bible has given rise. Yet the one is, in some sense, the parent of the other. An exegete, purporting to expound a passage, may deliver himself of thoughts which cannot be taken seriously as expressing the meaning of the passage. But it is commonly the case that those thoughts were distilled from long and general meditation on the scriptures. Sometimes things alien to the Bible are mingled in that meditation, yet not often to the total destruction of its kinship. The biblical authors have thus in some sense become the evokers, all down the centuries, of thought, expressed under the guise of exegesis, from the minds and hearts of devout readers. It is thought of which the permanent value varies very much, but often it lies so close to the value of Scripture itself that biblical studies would be the poorer, if it were all consigned to oblivion, as irrelevant to the interests of the modern student.

A generation ago, such a scholar as H. B. Swete could bring critical scholarship to bear upon a New Testament book, as he did in his commentary on St. Mark, and at the same time enrich his work with numbers of apposite comments from patristic and Reformation exegetes. In these days of acute specialization, a like result might call for collaboration between a biblical scholar, or even one may say, a specialist in that particular part of the biblical field, and students in more ecclesiastical fields.

The Bible took shape in the hands of a Church, and at times that process was determined by considerations far removed from the original meaning and purpose of the writings. But if the Bible is what the Church holds it to be, the original meaning of the several scriptures must have an undisputed first place as object of the exegetical task.

PAULINE PROBLEMS

APROPOS OF J. MUNCK, 'PAULUS UND DIE HEILSGESCHICHTE' [1]

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ALL HISTORICAL STUDIES suffer from the unconscious transformation of generally accepted hypotheses into 'universally known facts.' This transformation is particularly frequent in NT criticism, where the small amount of directly relevant material necessitates constant resort to hypotheses. Therefore particular credit is due to Munck for writing a book which challanges many of the accepted hypotheses about Paul.

Munck's account of early Christian history and of Paul's relation to it can be summarized as follows:

Jesus thought himself the Messiah and the beginning of the End (245,266).[2] Therefore (?) he required of his followers a fuller fulfillment of the Law, a fulfillment of its intent which turned out to mean that some commandments need not be literally obeyed (246–9). For the most part, however, he lived as a Jew, he preached only to Jews, and he forbade his followers to go to Samaritans or gentiles (251–5, 266).[3] His occasional kindnesses to heathens were all particular exceptions to his general policy of not addressing them (224 f., 242 f., 254 f.).

After Jesus' resurrection, his disciples formed a peculiar religious community, distinct from the Jews, whom they admitted only after baptism and who persecuted them (209–22). They continued, however, to observe many Jewish practices, no longer as commandments necessary for salvation, but merely as folk-customs (99 and refs. there).[4] They continued, also, to preach

[1] Copenhagen, 1954 (Acta Jutlandica 26.1).

[2] Throughout this article the numbers in parentheses refer to pages of Munck's book.

[3] Munck comments: 'Dieser scheinbare Partikularismus ist Ausdruck seines Universalismus: Jesus kommt gerade zu Israel, weil seine Sendung der ganzen Welt gilt.' (266).

[4] Mt. 23.3 is declared textually corrupt; it cannot report the teaching either of Jesus or of any Christian group important enough to have influenced the text of the Gospel (250).

only to Jews. Peter's conversion of Cornelius was understood to be an exceptional occurrence, due to special divine intervention — Acts is mistaken in reporting that it was taken as a precedent (204–8, 224 f., 228 f. on Acts 11.1, 18; 15.7, 14). Other conversions of gentiles which may have taken place at the same time, such as those which established the gentile Christian communities at Antioch and Rome, were ignored by the Jerusalem group, which took no interest whatever in gentiles — Acts is mistaken in representing the Jerusalem group as sending authoritative representatives to visit gentile communities (96 f., 226 f., 230–32, 250–59, 267–70 on Acts 11.22, 15.1, 23–35). The establishment of such communities was due, presumably, to Jewish Christians, but either they acted without authorization or they were specially commissioned by the risen Christ, who is presumed to have made a number of unrecorded appearances (201–3). However founded, such communities were commonly altogether gentile, Jewish Christians appeared in them only as exceptional visitors (98, n. 42, 115–6, 195 ff.). This was fortunate, since gentile Christians were never obligated to observe the Law. Therefore this division of Christendom into Jewish Christian communities, where most legal observances were maintained, and gentile Christian communities, where none were, prevented friction between Christians of the two types (115–6).

It is against this background that the work of Paul must be seen. Paul was a strict and self-satisfied Pharisee, whose sudden conversion was not the result of any prior psychological development (1–20).[5] At the time it occurred, the missionary work of

[5] Munck suggests (115–21; 228 ff.) that for Peter the conviction that observance of the Law was not necessary for salvation may have been based on his own inability, as an am-ha-arez, to observe it. The consequent theory is put in Peter's mouth by Acts 15.10 and is also appealed to by Paul in argument with Peter, as common ground, Gal. 2.14 ff. Perhaps it is one more likely to have been developed by an am-ha-arez, but such considerations are uncertain, cf. the familiar argument that only one who had made a desperate effort to observe the Law could be so thoroughly convinced of the impossibility of the task. Munck is certainly right in arguing (1, n. 2) that Phil. 3.6 f. tells strongly against the usual supposition that Gal. 2.15 ff. reflects Paul's experience of his own inability to fulfill the requirements of the Law. He does not directly discuss the problem of reconciling Phil. 3.6 with Rom. 3.9 ff., but it appears from his remarks in other connections (loc. cit. and 248) that he would probably say Phil. 3.6 was written from the viewpoint of a Jew ('blameless' — according to the generally accepted standards), Rom. 3.9 ff. from that of a Christian to whom Jesus' revela-

the Jerusalem community was limited not only to Jews, but also to Jerusalem (268). Paul began missionary work among Jews in Syria and Cilicia (ib.), but eventually came to conceive of himself as the apostle to the gentiles and to develop a new notion of the program of eschatological events (i.e., the *Heilsgeschichte*).[6] The Jerusalem group generally opined that after the conversion of the Jews the righteous gentiles would be converted either by miracle or by propaganda from the synagogues of the diaspora (230, 253–8). Now Paul advanced the theory that the conversion of the gentiles should precede the conversion of the Jews and occasion it by making the Jews jealous — therefore the End could not come until the Gospel had been preached to (representative groups of) all nations, and Paul himself, as *the* apostle appointed for this task, was forced to become the central figure of the history (28–53).[7] There is no explanation of the disappearance from this theory of all the other apostles to the gentiles, mentioned above.

Paul was ordered by revelation to go to Jerusalem and expound this view to the leaders of the community there, notably James and Peter. The object of his visit was not only to secure their recognition of the principle that the conversion of the gentiles might be a means to the conversion of the Jews, and their approval of his proposed work among the gentiles, but also to persuade them to take over his previous missionary work among

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tion of the deeper demands of the Law had revealed also the impossibility of any man's meeting them. Perhaps the most serious objection to be brought against Munck's account of Paul's conversion is that it simply ignores the existence of the subconscious mind and therefore treats Paul's persecution of Christianity as proof that he was 'immune' to the Gospel (5). Just the contrary!

[6] It is worth noting that this term — like *euangelion* — expresses the viewpoint of the elect. But the elect were a minority (Lk. 13.23 f. and //; Acts 4.12; II Thess. 1.8; &c.) From the viewpoint of most of the expected participants, as expressed by Celsus, the predicted events seemed rather a *Verdammungsgeschichte* (Adv. Cels. 3.16; 4.23, 73; 5.14; 7.9; 8.48). G. Wetter, Der Sohn Gottes, Göttingen, 1916, 123, has conjectured that it was the doctrine of the coming judgment which brought upon the early Christians the charge of being enemies of mankind. (Consequently John's insistence, that Jesus is not to be the judge of the world, may be apologetic, ib. 120–4.)

[7] Munck objects, however, that the usual picture of Paul cannot be true because it represents him as egotistical and sensitive to considerations of personal honor (44, n. 38; 77).

the Jews [8] of the eastern diaspora, so that he 'should not . . . have run' (there) 'in vain' (101, 111–114, on Gal. 2.2). In this he was successful. Peter agreed to a geographical division of the mission field, by which the Jerusalem group were to take up the work in the areas where the great majority of Jews lived (Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt) and were to address themselves primarily to Jews — though they might take in gentiles as exceptions — while Paul was to have all the rest of the Roman Empire and to make his object the conversion of the gentiles — though he would also take Jews, as exceptions. This geographical division was scrupulously observed by both sides and remained in force till Paul's death. It is carelessly expressed by Paul in Gal. 2.9. Acts 15.1 ff. has completely misrepresented the occasion and misunderstood the result of the conference (111–14, 226–32).

Because of this division of territories, there never was any serious friction between Paul, Peter and James. There had been a difference of opinion as to the place of the conversion of the gentiles in the eschatological program, but the above-mentioned conference produced enough agreement to enable them to coöperate (locc. citt.). There had been, also, a momentary disagreement between Peter and Paul, when Peter, at some time prior to the conference,[9] was, on his private business, staying in Antioch. On that occasion he at first ate with the gentile Christians. Then some friends of James who happened to arrive (also on private business) pointed out to him that this practice might damage his work with Jews. Therefore he gave it up, and the other Jewish Christians who were visiting the community did likewise. Paul objected that this was apt to persuade the gentiles to Judaize (though Judaization was not yet a problem). Peter must have been convinced by Paul's arguments and have publicly admitted that Paul was right, otherwise Paul would never have mentioned the event in arguing against Judaizers (when a Judaizing movement eventually did appear), since it would have been a point in

[8] The community at Antioch was gentile (98, 115 f.), but Paul's missionary work in Syria and Cilicia was among Jews (113 f.; 268 f.).

[9] That Paul reports it after his account of the conference (Gal. 2.11 ff.) proves nothing, according to Munck. It must have been before the conference, otherwise the disagreement could have been represented as annulling the results of the conference, or raising an issue not previously dealt with. In that event Paul would never have mentioned it in his argument (93).

their favor which he would, of course, have suppressed (86 f., 93–99).[10] All the other passages which have been taken to indicate disagreement between Paul and Peter or James or the Jerusalem group can — by similar methods — be shown insignificant (101–11).

However, Paul did have opponents and some of them were Judaizers.

The Judaizers appear only in Galatians.[11] There they must be local individuals of heathen origin, whose misunderstanding of the LXX had persuaded them that observance of circumcision and some other commandments of the Law was desirable for Christians, as a means of salvation. They supposed Paul had suppressed this fact in order to make his Gospel popular. Therefore they appealed from him to the practice of the twelve in Jerusalem, whom they supposed to be apostles and from whom they thought Paul's authority came. Apart from these suppositions — both mistaken — they knew almost nothing about the twelve, and all that they knew or supposed was based on what Paul had told them. Apart from him, they had no contact whatever with Palestinian Christianity (79–86, 122 f., 206–7). Acts 15.1 ff. has transferred the scene of the dispute to Antioch and referred the Judaizers to Jerusalem as part of its program to

[10] Contrast this argument of Munck's with his attack (76 f.) on the conventional picture of Paul as a 'Polemiker' 'der es mit der Wahrheit nicht so genau nimmt.' This picture he finds 'nicht anziehend' and therefore false. However, there is no doubt that Paul was not scrupulous about minor misrepresentations of fact: Paul himself admits it, II Cor. 9.2 ff. Contrast also II Thess. 3.8 ff., where he claims that he received no gifts from anyone while in Thessalonica (and uses the example of his own self-support to justify his prohibition of others' living on charity), with Phil. 4.16, where he reminds the Philippians that they had the unique honor of sending him contributions while he was in Thessalonica. As for apparent conformity to the norms of the surrounding society, he himself boasts of this, I Cor. 9.19–23, and in the conclusion of the following chapter gives a rationale of the practice: Voluntary abrogation of one's liberty is justifiable, even praiseworthy, if the sacrifice is made for a worthy cause and the observance of the Law is not thought an act of virtue in its own right. He does not, apparently, consider it an objection that such apparent conformity might occasion misunderstanding. In fact, I Cor. 9.19 ff. suggests that he practiced it in order to occasion misunderstanding. Acts 21.18–26 is understood by Munck to report, as it stands, a particular instance when (on the advice of the elders of the Christian community in Jerusalem) this general rule was put into practice. See below, notes 13 and 18.

[11] Col. 2.16–23 is not specifically discussed, in spite of the parallel to Gal. 4.9; the opponents in Phil. 3.2–8 are declared to be Jews, not Judaizers, in spite of 3.18 (274, n. 46).

represent all the questions of early Christianity as originating from and settled by the central community (96, 202, 226).

In Corinth, on the other hand, Paul's trouble was not with individuals, or any particular group of individuals, but with the community as a whole (180). There were no serious divisions in the community, only some differences of opinion due to the fact that the Corinthians had conceived the gospel as a sort of philosophy and accordingly declared themselves followers, some of one teacher — Paul — others of another — Peter, of whom, however, since he was working in Palestine, they knew only by hearsay from Paul (128–133). If they attributed to these different teachers any differences of teaching, those must have been the products of their own imaginations, and unimportant — since Paul does not mention them. Paul was more concerned about the misunderstanding of the nature of the gospel. Insofar as the question of personal adherence did concern him, it was by reason of his doctrine that his converts should imitate him, as he Christ. Therefore his main efforts went to show that the gospel was not wisdom, in the philosophic sense, and the Christian life not one of honor and worldly success, but imitation of the apostles and therefore participation in the sufferings of Christ (142–154, 178 f.). It was particularly unfortunate that, in the very last stage of the resultant dispute, a group of Jewish apostles of unknown origin happened to arrive in Corinth, and showed, by the airs they gave themselves, a very different conception of the apostolate. Paul was led to believe his teaching undermined by their example and consequently attacked them (179–81). He does not charge them with teaching Judaization. This proves they did not teach it. There is no trace of Judaization in the whole Corinthian correspondence (161, 167 f.).[12]

This outline by no means exhausts the content of Munck's work, which covers the whole of Paul's recorded career and contains a number of interesting incidental discussions.[13] Here have

[12] Munck does not mention the fact that three chapters of I Cor. (8–10) are given to the question of Christian liberty, with special reference to permitted and forbidden food. Nor could he explain this discussion as intended only for the Jewish Christians in the Corinthian community, since he thinks that community almost purely gentile (195).

[13] The remaining material may here be summarized by the following outline

been presented only the central thesis and the most important of the positions on which it rests.

Most generally, one may say, it is incredible that, if Paul had such a strong case as Munck invents for him, he should have so botched its presentation that Munck should require over a hundred pages (79–189) of closely printed exegesis to explain what he meant — as opposed to what he apparently said — in just three of his letters, and that all the major scholars of the past century should have misunderstood him. Munck tries to forestall this last objection by a long attack on the Tübingen school (61–78) which, he avers, has misled all subsequent Pauline scholarship. Now it is implausible to represent, for instance, Goguel — who is one of those Munck singles out (65) — as led astray by uncritical admiration of the results achieved by any scholar other than himself. But granting, for the sake of the argument, that modern scholarship has followed the Tübingen school in its account of Paul, it has to be shown that the Tübingen school was wrong in those particular theories which have been followed. Here Munck reasons: The school was wrong in its chronology, it dated Acts in the second century and therefore

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of its principal elements: Paul's troubles with the Corinthians ended happily. Romans, written in Corinth after the reconciliation, reports his reflections on the whole set of problems raised by the disputes of the preceding period; it is therefore worthless as evidence for the make up of the Christian community in Rome, except for the fact that it addresses those Christians as former gentiles (190–4). The rest of Paul's career is reported with reasonable accuracy in Acts, except that 21.20 must be textually corrupt. It represents the leaders of the Jerusalem community as counselling Paul to participate in a legal ceremony in order that the many Christians of Jerusalem who are zealots for the Law shall know that he also observes it. Munck thinks this deception and argues that such deception is incompatible with the moral character of James, the Brother of the Lord. Therefore the text must be emended so as to make Jews of the persons who are to be deceived. Just how this palliates the deception is not explained (234–7). It is argued that the point at issue in Paul's trial was the right of Christianity to be considered a form of Judaism, i.e., a licit religion (307–13). The difference reported by Philippians between those who favor Paul and those who preach Christ in order to get him in trouble is explained as a difference of policy, between those who wished to stand by him when he faced a criminal charge and those who wished to disassociate the movement from him (317 ff.). The development of Paul's eschatological expectations is traced and it is argued that, although he at one time hoped to precipitate the End by bringing the gentiles and their tribute (from Greece) to Jerusalem — so fulfilling such prophecies as Is. 2.2; 60.5 f.; &c. — he came to see, during his imprisonment in Jerusalem, that the fitting conclusion for his career was an appearance before the emperor, therefore his appeal was also an eschatological action (294–302; 319–21).

could allow a hundred years for the reconciliation of the conflict between Jacobean and Pauline Christians and the development of the harmonistic attitude Acts was thought to reflect. To-day Acts is dated in the first century, therefore there is no time for such development, therefore the notion of the original conflict must be abandoned (61 f.). This has its plausibility, but is an objection to which Munck's reconstruction is even more vulnerable than Baur's. For — as seen above — Munck is forced to suppose that the author of Acts has misunderstood the relation of Paul to the Jerusalem group, has forgotten the significance of the council at which the epoch-making division of the mission fields took place, and has fundamentally false notions of the history of the Judaizing movement, of the function of the Jerusalem community in the history of the Church, and — since Munck's emendation of Acts 21.20 (v. sup. n. 13) cannot be taken seriously — of the make up of the Jerusalem community as late as 60 A.D. Now less time is required for the appearance of deliberate, harmonistic falsification than for the complete forgetting of the real issues involved. Therefore the present dating of the NT documents is less damaging to the position of the Tübingen school than it is to Munck's.

This problem has an interesting parallel in the criticism of the Gospels, where there is an obvious conflict between the early dating now customary and the indications of development and reinterpretation, found by Formgeschichte, which evidently require a considerable lapse of time.[14] It is remarkable that a similar lapse should be required by the disagreements between Acts and the Pauline letters. One of the problems which Munck's work raises, therefore, is whether the present dating of the NT material should not be carefully reconsidered.

By contrast to these chronological considerations, some of Munck's objections to the methods of the Tübingen school and of later Pauline criticism are well justified, particularly his insistence that Paul's letters are the primary source for his life and times (71 ff.) and that they must be interpreted individually (77 f.). The environment of early Christianity was extremely various.

[14] Here, too, the present dating can best be retained by supposing deliberate misrepresentation. See my remarks on Mk. 11.1–13.37, HTR 48 (1955) 45–6.

Each community had its own problems and history. Therefore, while it is not unlikely that heresies may have spread from one place to another, no letter should be forced into agreement with one written to a different place, still less with Acts or the Gospels, which are, as Munck says, secondary sources for the history of Christianity before 70.

For this reason it might be objected that the above summary of Munck's theory was unfair, since it began with Jesus and came down to Paul, whereas Munck begins with the Pauline epistles and then interprets Acts and the Gospels to agree with positions defended in his prior interpretation of the epistles.[15] However, his interpretation of the epistles turns out, on inspection, to be based on his theory as summarized above. It proceeds constantly by argument from silence. Whenever he can show, to his satisfaction, that a passage need not be interpreted so as to contradict his theory, he proceeds to suppose that it must be interpreted so as to agree with it. Of the many examples of this which his work affords,[16] the treatment of Gal. 2.1–10 is perhaps the most important. We shall therefore consider it at some length.

In Galatia the doctrine that gentile Christians need not observe the Jewish law was being challenged by a group of Judaizers who appealed, whether justly or not, to the example or teaching of the Jerusalem group. Therefore in writing to defend this doctrine — which he equates with *his* 'gospel' [17] — Paul first insists on its — and his — divine authority. He insists that he did not get his gospel from men — particularly, not from the Jerusalem group — and did not owe his authority to them. He drives this home by declaring that he did not see them for more than two weeks during the first fourteen (or seventeen?) years of his

[15] His treatment of the Gospels, in particular, makes no pretense to be more than the discussion of a few passages which can be understood as supporting his conclusions, or as apparently opposed to them. Therefore it need not be further considered here.

[16] A few of the more important are on pp. 131–7, 168 and 170 f.

[17] An unlikely equation if this doctrine was, as Munck supposes, taught and practiced by *all* Christians except the dissenting group in Galatia. Munck has well remarked (176) how Paul likes to settle questions by referring to the practice of the universal Church. Had such reference been possible in his dispute with the Galatians, it is almost incredible that he should not have used it.

work. Then he goes on to his second point: When a conference did take place, they did not require any change in his teaching. He says:

> 2.1–2 'Then . . . . I went up again to Jerusalem . . . (2) and I went up by revelation.'

Munck (95): Therefore this is probably not the visit reported in Acts 15, for 'Wenn die Offenbarung mit äusseren Ereignissen zusammengetroffen wäre, hätten diese in solchem Falle in Gal. 2.2 gennant sein *müssen.*' (My italics.)

> 2.2 (ctd.) 'And I set forth to them the gospel which I preach among the gentiles, privately, however, to those of repute, lest I should run or have run in vain.'

Here the first two clauses clearly indicate that the meeting was concerned with the validity of Paul's gospel, not the division of the mission field. (The Galatians were not questioning the division of the mission field.) Nevertheless, Munck pays no attention to these two clauses. Instead, he seizes on the third, notes that the same metaphor is used in Phil. 2.16, and concludes that this passage, like Phil. 2.16, must refer to Paul's having, at the End, results — converts — to show for his work (100). So far so good. But he then hypothecates, without evidence, that Paul feared lest his future work among the gentiles might be misunderstood by the Jerusalem group did he not persuade them of its necessity (101) and the fruits of his past work among the Jews lost, did he not persuade them to take over (113 f.). Beside being irrelevant to the context, this explanation does not satisfy even the criterion recognized by Munck. If Paul was the completely independent preacher of a God-given gospel, acceptance of which was the sole and sufficient requirement for salvation, then the disapproval of the Jerusalem group could not make his work of no effect — particularly if, as Munck supposes, that group stayed in Jerusalem and had nothing to do with the gentile world where Paul was preaching. True, Paul might fear the relapse of his previous Jewish converts unless the Jerusalem group consented to look after them — that could explain 'have run.' But 'should run' requires that the approval of the Jerusalem group should somehow be requisite for the validity of Paul's

subsequent work, and it is therefore natural to interpret 'have run' as indicating that Paul thought such approval necessary for the validation of his past work, too. Certainly the privacy of the conversations suggests, at very least, that neither of the parties concerned wished to risk open disagreement with the other. The same interpretation is required for the whole verse by the entire context, which knows nothing whatever of the concerns Munck invented to explain the one clause he tore from it.

To this Munck's only answer is that Paul 'can' not mean that he was dependent on Jerusalem (96). No doubt, because such an admission would justify the appeal of the Judaizers. But if the Jerusalem authorities were in agreement with Paul — as Paul claims they were — then an admission of dependence would not damage his argument. Nor would it contradict his previous argument, that he did not derive his authority or teaching from them (though the use of contradictory arguments would not be incredible per se). Dependence is of many sorts, and Paul's dependence on the Jerusalem group may be the prototype of that dependence in which Christian mystics have always found themselves vis-à-vis the authorities of the Church. The mystic is in direct touch with the higher power, but the higher power subjects him to the lower organization. Christianity was, for Paul, a historical religion, having at the heart of it the death of a historical individual — this is generally admitted. What is not generally admitted, but is indubitably indicated by this verse, is that Paul attributed to that individual's immediate followers and family some sort of authority such that their disapproval might have made his work vain. Therefore the second of the major problems raised by Munck's work is: What was the nature and extent of the authority of the Jerusalem group?

In Gal. 2.1–10 the text has no such break after verse 2 as has been made here by the above discussion. The whole paragraph is a unit, poured out in Paul's most hurried style, as if spoken all in one long breath. It continues:

> 2.3–6 'But not even Titus, who was with me and was a Greek, was compelled to be circumcised, (4) but — because of the false brethren, secretly brought in, who came in dishonestly, to spy out our freedom which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might enslave

> us, (5) to whom we did not, even for the moment, give way submissively, in order that the truth of the gospel might remain with you. (6) Moreover, from those who were reputed to be something (whatever they were makes no difference to me, God is no respecter of persons) — anyhow, those of repute added nothing to me.'

Munck's theory requires that the Judaizers of Galatia should have no knowledge of Jerusalem, other than that they derived from Paul. Therefore he is forced to take vs. 3 to mean, 'But if your claims were correct, Titus, who was with me, since he was a Greek, would have had to be circumcised. Now this did not happen.' (88). Then he is forced to suppose a complete break between vss. 3 and 4. Vss. 4–6 are taken to mean, 'But as for the false brethren (viz., the Judaizers among you in Galatia), who came into (the Church, in Galatia) dishonestly &c., to them I have never given way (in this matter of circumcision) . . . But from those (back, again, in Jerusalem) who were reputed &c.' (90). But this will not do. *Dia* ('because of') cannot mean 'as for.' There is no adequate rendition of the word 'secretly brought in' (by whom?) nor any means of explaining 'to spy out.' (To whom would the spies report, and what could be done if they did?) The jumping back and forth from Jerusalem to Galatia is utterly implausible, the anacoluthon of vss. 4–5 is not explained, and the break between vss. 3 and 4 would never have been posited had not the interpreter been unwilling to accept the simpler explanation of the passage: Titus was circumcised and Paul is now finding the fact an embarrassment. His embarrassment appears in the incoherence of his clauses and his attempt to conceal the fact even while he concedes it: Titus was not *compelled* to be circumcised, but (he voluntarily underwent the operation, in order to prevent scandal) because of false brethren . . . to whom we did not give way (in essential matters of doctrine, as opposed to concessions of practice) . . . Moreover, those of repute added nothing (to my gospel).

Munck thinks this interpretation simply impossible (87). It is 'ausgeschlossen' (without any discussion whatever) that Paul should have permitted the circumcision of a baptized gentile. But it is not. I Cor. 8–10 lays down quite clearly the principle that Christians may voluntarily, in order to prevent scandal,

undertake legal observances, provided they are convinced of their unimportance. Paul there boasts that he has become as a Jew to the Jews, and concludes by urging his disciples to imitate him (I Cor. 11.1). How far this imitation should go would, of course, depend on circumstances, but Acts 16.3 reports at least one other instance when it did extend to circumcision.[18]

The simple explanation of the text is therefore acceptable. It demonstrates that the Galatian Judaizers were in touch with Jerusalem by other means than through Paul — since they knew details of Paul's visit which he would hardly have publicized — and that there was, at Jerusalem, a considerable group, distinct from 'those of repute,' to which the spies Paul complains of would have reported and which would have made trouble had it known Titus to be uncircumcised. This state of affairs accords perfectly with Acts 15.1, 5 and 21.20–26 (a 'we' passage).[19] Further traces of Judaization in Pauline communities are clear in Col. 2.16–23 (// Gal. 4.9). They are likely in Philippians, where 3.2–8 is probably to be interpreted in the light of 3.17 f., and 3.17 f. is certainly a warning against persons within the Christian community. They are possible in II Cor., where 11.4 recalls Gal. 1.6–9, though here Munck's argument — from silence, as usual (168) — is strong enough to leave the subject in doubt. There is no good reason for thinking the Judaizers of Galatia were inspired by gentile Christians.[20] Even less likely is the notion

[18] This seems to me more probable than the explanation that Paul considered Timothy a Jew because his mother was a Jewish Christian. For the moral problems raised by this doctrine, and further parallels, see above, n. 10. It is quite useless to cite, against this interpretation, verses like Gal. 5.2, for they refer — as the context clearly shows — to circumcision-in-order-to-fulfill-the-Law, which is quite a different thing, to Paul's mind, from circumcision-as-a-concession-to-others'-weakness.

[19] It should be noted that in this passage the observance of the Law by gentiles is not in question. Paul is charged with teaching the Jews of the diaspora not to observe the Law, and is advised to refute the rumor by demonstrating that he himself observes it. The question of the gentiles is taken as settled by the decision of ch. 15. This limits the significance of Paul's action, but does not touch the essential question, since the antinomian core of his teaching was obviously applicable to converted Jews, and it is hardly credible that he refrained from making this application in particular practice as he did in general theory.

[20] Munck (79 ff.) attempts to prove this from the use of the present participle in Gal. 6.13. But the force of the tenses of Greek participles is not very reliable (H. Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges, N.Y., N.D., sec. 1872, a, 1; cf. secs. 2043, 2052a, 2091) and here, in particular, the verse presumably refers to persons

that they were led to Judaization by their own reading of the LXX. No doubt those who had been hangers on or proselytes of Judaism before their conversion to Christianity may have had some knowledge of the LXX and even some access to the text — in itself no small problem. But in that event they would also have been accessible to Jewish and Jewish-Christian influence. Munck's statement that 'Der Judaismus der Heidenchristen schwebt also in der Luft.' (86, cf. 122 f., 199 ff.) is the most serious criticism of his own theory. Also, his favorite method of argument from silence could be turned against him, here, with considerable effect: Is it conceivable that Paul, if opposed in Galatia by the advocates of a home-brewed pseudo-Judaism, should have failed to contrast their knowledge of the subject with his own? Hardly.

In sum, the Pauline epistles and Acts agree in reporting a Judaizing movement of which there are traces in a number of the Pauline communities. This movement had connections with Jerusalem and was represented there by a group which was influential, though James, Peter and John did not belong to it. The third of the problems raised by Munck's work is that of determining the nature, extent and history of this movement, and especially its relation to the leaders of the Jerusalem group.

The obverse of this problem is that of the relation of James, Peter and John to Paul, which confronts us as we return to Munck's exegesis of Gal. 2.1–10. Here, as before, there is no break in the text at the point where it was broken off above for discussion. This will be clearer if vs. 6 is quoted again:

> 6–10 'Moreover, from those who were reputed to be something (whatever they were makes no difference to me, God is no respecter of persons) — anyhow, those of repute added nothing to me, (7) but, on the contrary, seeing that I have been entrusted with the gospel for (or, of?) the uncircumcised, as Peter that of the circumcised (8) (for He who worked through Peter for the apostolate of the circumcised worked also through me for the gentiles) (9) and

who had been circumcised before Paul wrote (certainly not to persons being circumcised at the very moment of writing). Just how long in the past the operation had taken place can hardly be determined from the use of a present participle. Prof. A. D. Nock suggests the translation, 'who are by way of being circumcised,' which is as indefinite as the original.

recognizing the grace given me, James and Cephas and John, those reputed to be pillars, gave me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship, so that we — to the gentiles and they to the circumcised, (10) provided only that we should remember the poor.'

Munck (91) argues that the parenthesis in vs. 6 cannot be directed against 'those of repute' in Jerusalem, because Paul here reports their agreement with him. Therefore it must be directed against the Galatians who had (it is, without evidence, presumed) been trying to discredit Paul by reporting that he had once persecuted the Church. This verse is to remind them that the Jerusalem leaders, too, had once denied or abandoned Christ. It was negligent of Paul to write 'whatever they were' rather than 'whatever they did.' As before, Munck pays no attention to the context, where 'God is no respecter of persons' clearly shows that the contrast is between their visible office and their actual standing in the sight of God.[21] About this latter, Paul will not argue; [22] he is content to rest his argument, here, on their de facto authority and on their past agreement with him and with Barnabas.

That agreement, according to Paul's report in vss. 9–10, contained three elements: (a) the Jerusalem leaders gave him and Barnabas 'the right hand of fellowship' (b) so that he and Barnabas — to the gentiles, and they to the circumcised (c) provided only that he and Barnabas should remember the poor.

Munck is much exercised to show that the last of these provisions did not represent a tax laid on the diasporic communities by the Jerusalem authorities (282–286). The argument on which he lays most weight — that if such a tax had been imposed Paul would have been guilty of falsehood in representing to prospective donors that contributions to the fund he was raising should be

[21] Close parallels in Plato, Euthyd. 303 C, and Philo, Mos. 2.241. ἦσαν refers to the time of the conference. It is not to be contrasted with the present tense of δοκοῦντες, since the temporal force of such participles is negligible (v.s., n. 20). Paul is making, in passing, a pun on the participial sense of οἱ δοκοῦντες — 'those seeming' — and its use by transference as a noun to mean 'persons of position' (Euripides, Hec. 295). It would be pedantic to press either the details of the wording, or the logical implications, of such a passing pun.

[22] It may be that the Judaizers had appealed to the Jerusalem figures not only as ecclesiastical authorities, but also as persons of special holiness and gifted with special spiritual powers (cf. II Cor. 12.1, 11 f.); it may be — on the other hand — that the Judaizers had attacked the Jerusalem leaders as hypocritical and were therefore particularly bitter about Paul's dependence on them.

given by them as free gifts (283) — is inconclusive, not only because Paul was not above occasional misrepresentation (especially in financial matters, v.s., n. 10), but also because Munck fails to distinguish between the obligation of the apostle to raise a fund and the obligation of the ordinary Christians to contribute to it. Even to-day most denominations lay obligatory quotas on their parishes and most priests urge their parishioners to give freely. On the other hand, the language of vs. 10 does not indicate any clear legal obligation [23] and Munck has shown, at least, that there is no decisive evidence for any such legal claim. However, there *was* an understanding that Paul and Barnabas were to raise money for the Jerusalem group, and their consent to do this doubtless had some relation to the other elements of the agreement.

Munck finds it inconceivable that Paul should have collected money for his 'implacable opponents' in Jerusalem (285) and therefore concludes that his relations with Jerusalem were altogether cordial. But 'implacable' is an unnecessary assumption. The Jerusalem group may have been of two minds about Paul's work: On the one hand, it was inadequate, since his converts did not keep the Law, and even dangerous, since it might lead Jews into transgression; on the other hand, it was better than nothing, since it did preach Christ, and it created centers in which further work by their own representatives could easily be started. In the event of such a balancing of considerations, a generous gesture on the part of Paul may have been enough to turn the balance, temporarily, at least, to the side of approval. Even more likely — since Acts 21.20 explicitly reports it on the basis of first hand information —is the supposition that the Jerusalem group contained a party other than that headed by James, and unfriendly to Paul, whereas the party headed by James was friendly. In that event, substantial gifts would provide Paul's friends with substantial arguments in his favor and would strengthen their hands against his — and their? — opponents.

Much more difficult is the question: What does the second element of the agreement mean? Munck (111–14, 226–32) takes

[23] Prof. A. D. Nock remarks in a note to me, 'the use of ἵνα may simply represent an imperative.'

it as indicating a geographical division of the mission field, by which Peter got Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Cilicia and Mesopotamia, and undertook to convert the Jews there (though he would also take gentiles, by exception), while Paul got all the rest of the Roman Empire and undertook the conversion of the gentiles there (though he would also take Jews). Nothing whatever, in all the NT, shows any knowledge by any author of any such territorial division. The supposition of it forces Munck to discredit the early tradition that Peter worked in Asia Minor (I Pet. 1.1.) and to concoct the most unlikely hypotheses to explain the references to Peter in I Cor.[24] Why, then, suppose it? Because it helps eliminate all cause for conflict between Peter and Paul. The above agreement is supposed to have been observed by both sides. But Acts represents Paul as going first, in every city, to the Jews, and as converting some of them. Further, Paul speaks of his own work among the Jews and his efforts to convert them (II Cor. 11.24 f., I Cor. 9.20). Therefore the argument must be made to fit Paul's practice. The territorial interpretation — which there is nothing to indicate and which practically contradicts the plain sense of the text — has been invented for this express purpose.

On the other hand, Munck is correct in sensing a difficulty. We saw above that Paul was trying, in general, to persuade the Galatians of the authority of his gospel — especially, his doctrine of Christian liberty — and that in this paragraph his particular point was that this gospel was known and approved by the Jerusalem authorities. This point is made in vs. 6. Why, then, should Paul go on to report an agreement about a division of the mission field, especially if it were one which had since broken down and which he was systematically violating?

These objections are by no means conclusive. Paul may have thought the fact that there had been such an agreement, even if it had not been long observed, strengthened his hand. The situation may have had aspects unknown to us which gave his words more point than now appears.

However, it is most probable that Paul is not here talking about the division of the mission field at all, but about his pre-

[24] See above, in the outline, Munck 133.

vious subject, the authority of his gospel. In verse 6 he stated the negative — when he set forth his gospel to the authorities in Jerusalem they required no changes in it. He now goes on to the positive — 'But, on the contrary' they recognized it, 'the gospel of the uncircumcised,' to be the work of the same grace of the same Lord who had inspired Peter's gospel, 'the gospel of the circumcised.' Therefore they formally declared their communion with himself and Barnabas (i.e., recognized that they were working for the same cause) and agreed that he and Barnabas should preach the gospel given for (i.e., in the course of their work with) the gentiles, while they themselves should preach the gospel given through Peter in the course of his work with the Jews.[25]

This interpretation makes the verses relevant to Paul's argument. However, it forces slightly the last clause of verse 9, which probably specifies the people preached to, not the gospel preached. But that clause is elliptical, therefore one cannot be sure that Paul's thought, or the Jerusalem agreement, about this point was perfectly precise. Now such vagueness would be sur-

[25] To this interpretation someone will certainly object that Paul recognized only one gospel, his own, that he anathematized anyone who should preach the Galatians another (Gal. 1.8), and that he rebuked Peter for not walking 'according to the truth of the' — undoubtedly Pauline — 'gospel' (Gal. 2.14). But this argument neglects the complex nature of unity. Paul could, on occasion, speak with approval of two different gospels: Gal. 2.7, on which see A. Fridrichsen, The Apostle and His Message, Uppsala, 1947 (U. U. Årsskrift), 8–11. Further, Paul's use of 'my' gospel sometimes seems to suppose the existence of other gospels differing from his own (Rom. 16.25; II Cor. 4.3; cf. I Cor. 15.1; Gal. 1.11; 2.2); and in Gal. 1.6 he declares that one such gospel is being preached, though he violently disapproves of it (cf. II Cor. 11.4). Therefore 'gospel' for Paul is an ambiguous term. There is *the* gospel (of Christ) which, presumably, all good gospels have in common. There are at least two good gospels, that of the circumcision and that of the uncircumcision, and we are not told how they differ — perhaps in secondary content, perhaps in method of presentation, perhaps in proposed audience, perhaps in all three. Finally, there are other gospels which are bad, because they do not accord with *the* gospel. In this paragraph Paul is arguing for the authority of the-gospel-which-he-preaches-among-the-gentiles, viz., that 'of the uncircumcision.' One of his arguments is that it was recognized to be the work of the same Lord who inspired that 'of the circumcision.' His anathemas on anyone who preaches any other gospel to the Galatians (Gal. 1.8) may be explained by the context as referring to false gospels only, or as motivated by a concern lest the Galatians be confused by the variety of true teachings, or as the result of anger at others' poaching on his preserves, or — most likely, in Paul — as a careless utterance, expressing his immediate feelings more accurately than his general theory. The possible explanations of the scene in Antioch are equally numerous and even more hypothetical.

prising if this point were, as Munck's interpretation makes it, the principal concern of the meeting. But we have seen that Munck's interpretation is quite alien to Paul's purpose, which was not to report a division of the mission field, but to insist on the approval of his gospel by the Jerusalem group. If this be taken to be the main concern of the sentence (as the clause which reports it is the main clause), then, 'so that we — to the gentiles and they to the circumcised' may not have figured in the agreement at all. It may be merely Paul's comment on and interpretation of his main concern, 'the right hand of fellowship.' Even if it did appear in the agreement it may have been nothing more than a general understanding that the two different gospels were best suited for work with these two different groups, respectively. If so, Paul's subsequent conversions of Jews present no problem and his reason for reporting the agreement to the Galatians is clear.

In sum, then, this study of Munck's interpretation of Gal. 2.1–10 has repeatedly shown that he did not derive his theory from Paul's letters, but imposed it on them. Therefore we were justified, above, in stating the theory first, as a unit, and we may now proceed to comment on its elements in their normal historical order.

The question of Jesus' relation to the Law is immensely complex and Munck has paid practically no attention to one of its most important complicating factors — the variety of Judaism in the period prior to 70. He argues, for instance, 'Even if Jesus did carry on conversations with Jewish opponents about legal questions,' his utterances on these questions, being contrary to the Jewish teaching, 'would not have been handed down, had the oldest community had a completely Jewish standpoint' (243). But the notion that there was one, definitive, Jewish teaching on these questions at this period is utterly false. On the contrary, in representing Jesus as maintaining his peculiar opinions on these questions, the Gospels represent him as doing a typically Jewish thing, and those opinions would probably not have been handed down unless some early Christian community *had* maintained a completely Jewish standpoint. Only to a community

which still thought the halakah important would such halakic decisions be significant,[26] and such halakic arguments, as are sometimes used to support them, be of weight.[27] Perhaps it is for this reason that the strand of tradition which most clearly reports this material — that of the *Streitgeschichte* — is among the most sharply marked, distinct and, one is tempted to say, isolated, in the Gospels.[28]

Since Judaism was so various in the period before 70, there is little force in Munck's argument that, because the Christians recognized themselves as a peculiar group, admitted Jews only after baptism, expressed their unity in a special communal meal, and were recognized and persecuted by 'the Jews' as a peculiar group, therefore Christianity was from the first a new religion (209–12). The members of the Dead Sea sect also recognized themselves as a peculiar group, admitted Jews only after elaborate purifications, expressed their unity in a special communal meal and had been recognized and persecuted as a peculiar group by the Jewish authorities; were they too, therefore, not Jews?

Along with — and probably as a consequence of — this variety of Judaism, goes the great variety of early Christianity. In respect to this, Munck's position is less uniform. He well and clearly recognizes that Acts' account of the growth of a single Church from the single center of Jerusalem is a late schematization which almost certainly does not correspond to the original facts (202 f.). There were probably many preachers who, like Paul during the first years of his ministry, had no connection whatever with the Christians of Jerusalem. Certainly Galilee, and possibly Damascus, the northern cities of the Decapolis, Samaria, Caesarea, Ptolemais and Tyre may have been, at first, independent centers of Christian life and of missionary activity. Whenever it is a question of Jewish missionaries in what he sup-

[26] As that, for instance, on the permissibility of preparing food on the Sabbath, Mk. 2.23 ff.

[27] E.g., Mat. 12.5 f.; on the difference of Mat. from Mk. here see the excellent remarks of D. Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism, London, 1956, 66–71.

[28] This is not to say that it is also the earliest and most reliable, see my comments in JBR 24 (1956) 94 f.

poses to be Paul's territory, Munck is admirably awake to these possibilities and quick to assert that the mere fact of the missionaries' being Jewish does not prove any connection with Jerusalem (e.g., 178). Indeed, as shown above, he goes out of his way to overlook or to deny the connections with Jerusalem which Acts reports and the evidence, from Paul's own letters, that the leaders in Jerusalem did have some sort of authority which made even such independents as Paul anxious lest their approval should be denied him, and proud of having secured it. But, in the light of Paul's concern, Acts' account of the Jerusalem leaders' sending out representatives to visit communities and announce decisions (8.14; 11.22; 15.22 ff.) is not to be rejected out of hand as fictitious. Incidentally, it is exactly paralleled by the practice of Paul's teacher, Rabban Gamaliel the elder (Tosefta Sanhedrin 2.6).[29] Granted that Acts gives a false impression by omitting references to other centers of the movement, this does not automatically discredit the material which it does report.

On the other hand, when it comes to discussing the Christian community in Jerusalem (where even Acts admits there were different cliques — 6.1 — and differences of opinion — 11.2; 15.5; 21.20 ff.) Munck does his best to eliminate any trace of difference and to represent the community as absolutely homogeneous.[30] For instance, he repeatedly argues that since Peter and James were not unfriendly to Paul,[31] no group in the Jeru-

[29] 'A case in point (to illustrate the procedure in official decisions as to the calendar) is that of Rabban Gamaliel and the elders, who customarily sat (in formal session) on the steps of the Temple, with Johanan, the official secretary, in their presence. They would say to him, "Write: To our brethren, the men of Upper Galilee and the men of Lower Galilee. May your peace increase. We make known to you that the time of the removal has come, for the removal of tithes from the pits where olives are stored." Or, "To our brethren, the men of the Upper Negeb and the men of the Lower Negeb. May your peace increase. We make known to you that the time of the removal has come, for the removal of tithes from the wheat sheaves." Or, "To our brethren, the men of the diaspora of Babylon and the men of the diaspora of Media and all the other diasporas of Israel. May your peace increase. We make known to you that the young pigeons have not yet feathered and the young lambs are yet small and the season of ripening has not come; therefore it has seemed good to us and to our colleagues to add to this year thirty days." '

[30] E.g., his secondary arguments against Acts 20.21 (235 f.), all of which presuppose a small, centralized community, where all the members knew everything that went on.

[31] It is one of Munck's major accomplishments to have challenged seriously, if

salem community could have been (e.g., 234 f.: Had such a group existed the Jerusalem authorities would have failed in their duty had they not corrected it. Therefore, none existed.). What is worse, this homogeneous Jerusalem community is described as '*das* Judenchristentum' (my italics) and we are told again and again that '*das* Judenchristentum' or '*die* judenchristliche Kirche' (again my italics) thought the conversion of the gentiles should follow that of the Jews, therefore took no present interest in gentiles, and regarded the conversion of occasional individuals from them as wholly exceptional (96 f., 112, 115, 122, cf. 208, n. 2, which overlooks Acts 2.14, 255 ff., &c.). All this in complete contradiction to what is said elsewhere — rightly — of the great number and variety of Jewish-Christian missionaries among the gentiles, and of the probability that the major gentile Christian communities were founded by Jewish Christians (199–203).

What is the source of these contradictions? Ultimately, it is uncritical acceptance of Acts' picture of Paul as *the* apostle to the gentiles. Of course, that picture is produced by the omission of any full account of the other apostles to the gentiles, just as Acts' picture of Jerusalem as the sole center of Christianity was produced by omission of any reference to the other primitive centers. Munck recognizes this when he has occasion to emphasize the number and variety of missions to the gentiles (see above), but when he turns from history to theology and writes of Paul's place in the Heilsgeschichte, the other missionaries are completely forgotten, Paul is the solitary apostle by whose work alone the End will come. Now this conception of *the* apostle and *the* mission to the gentiles must, of course, be contrasted with *the* mission and therefore *the* apostle to the Jews. The mere dramatic and schematic character of such a contrast is prima facie evidence that it derives from theology, not from history. However, Munck found a proof text for it — Gal. 2.7 ff., interpreted as an account of the division of the mission field.

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not refuted entirely, the notion that either Peter or James was the sponsor of the Judaizing movement and therefore behind the opposition to Paul. Munck's argument on this point depends on the interpretation of many details and runs throughout the whole book, e.g., 94, 99, 101 ff., 104 ff., 118, 134, 172, 228–31.

Here is the source of his notion of united Judenchristentum, one and indivisible, undertaking, through its one apostle, Peter, the one mission to the Jews.[32]

It was seen above that Gal. 2.7 ff. did not report any such formal division of the mission field. Here it may be added that neither of the parties to the agreement had the field to divide. Paul was not the only missionary to the gentiles; indeed, the very text of this agreement lumps his work with that of Barnabas, and he and Barnabas were not always in perfect concord (Acts 15.39). Neither, as remarked above, did the Jerusalem group, much less Peter, have a monopoly on work with the Jews, particularly in the diaspora, as Paul's record shows. Therefore it is presumable that Paul's contrast here of his work and gospel with those of Peter is based on the fact that Peter had been the outstanding (not, the only) apostle (or theologian, or both) of the Jerusalem group. This argues that Paul claimed for himself no more than a similar preëminence, not an exclusive competence. The same conclusion is suggested by his association of himself with Barnabas in the actual agreement. And the same conclusion is indicated by the passages of his letters in which he speaks of his work. None of those mentioned in this connection by Munck [33]

[32] Munck thinks the Twelve came to be called apostles only as a result of later Christian misunderstanding of a reference by Paul to the Galatians' misunderstanding of their position (206–7). For him, Peter was the only other apostle in the same sense as Paul, the remaining uses of the word refer to individuals of an entirely different rank and function (53). It is interesting to note, as an incidental result of this discussion, that Munck's theory turns out to be built principally on an uncritical acceptance of one aspect of Acts and on a polemical passage in one of Paul's letters — although he particularly inveighs against the previous uncritical acceptance of Acts and the use of the polemical passages of the letters as guides to the interpretation of the rest (72 ff.).

[33] Munck 28–60 and passim, esp. 33 ff., 38 f., 111–14, 195 ff. The chief texts are Rom. 1.5; 11.13 ff.; 15.16 ff.; I Cor. 9.1–6; II Cor. 10.8; 11.23–30; Gal. 1.16; 2.2, 7–9; Col. 1.23–9. To these may be added (from Fridrichsen, Apostle, 7, cit. sup. n. 25, where the same theory is defended) II Cor. 2.14 ff. It is clear that Paul thought his message valid for all the gentiles, but presumably he thought it valid for all the Jews, too (Gal. 2.14–21). Therefore the notion of its universal validity cannot be made to imply the notion of his own universal authority, as Fridrichsen attempts to make it. Nor is reference to Paul's 'care of all the churches' (II Cor. 11.28) justified as proof of this point. Paul, in that verse, is boasting of his burdens. Now he pretty certainly was not burdened with the care of the church in Alexandria, nor of that in Rome. Therefore when he boasts of caring for 'all' the churches, he must mean no more than 'all those many which I *do* supervise.' The authority implied is merely extensive, not all-inclusive, still less exclusive.

implies an exclusive apostolate. (Paul's habitual use of the first person singular does not imply that there are no other workers.) Further, there are a number of texts in which Paul equates himself with other apostles, including some to the gentiles: I Cor. 4.6–9 (with Apollos, contrast Munck 53); 9.5; 12.28; 15.9. When he is claiming authority, in writing to the Corinthians, he says only, 'Am I not an apostle?' (I Cor. 9.1), not, 'Am I not the apostle to the gentiles?' When he does claim preëminence, he claims it only in respect of sufferings (II Cor. 11.23 ff.) and success in making converts (I Cor. 15.10), but this very claim implies he is not the unique apostle to the gentiles, but only the outstanding one. Consequently Munck's identification of him as ὁ κατέχων — the one who is holding up the program — in II Thess. 2.7 is not persuasive. Admittedly, the evidence is not perfectly conclusive. It is conceivable that Munck (30–39) may be right in this identification and in supposing that Paul thought himself the sole (important) apostle to the gentiles, the one figure for the completion of whose work God was waiting, the forerunner appointed to bring the End. Paul may, in sum, have been an egomaniac, but the passages cited by Munck as yet do not suffice to prove it.[34]

The problem of Paul's concept of his gospel and his work will have to be restudied. The great service of Munck's study, in this respect, is to have emphasized that this concept of Paul's must define both his relation to the Jerusalem leaders and his relation to the eschatological program. Paul certainly saw both himself and his contemporaries as figures in the eschatological drama.[35] His actions and utterances are those required by his role as he conceived it; they cannot be understood without a

[34] Munck promises (38, n. 20) to treat the question of the apostolate in a later volume. Therefore the opinions he has advanced here may not have been supported as fully as they otherwise would have been.

[35] This point was already made by Fridrichsen, Apostle, cit. sup. n. 25, and by O. Cullmann, Le Caractère eschatologique du devoir missionaire, RHPR 16 (1936) 210 ff. Fridrichsen's work further agrees with Munck's in a number of important points, notably the concept of Peter as *the* apostle to the circumcision, over against Paul as *the* apostle to the gentiles, based on Gal. 2.7, and the attempt to justify this by supposing that the Jerusalem council resulted in a geographical division of the mission field (though F. gives Paul everything outside Palestine). F.'s arguments for these theories, however, are not so strong as to have required special notice above.

knowledge of the plot — not, of course, the entire plot (which God alone foreknew), but the section which Paul believed himself to know. In showing that the knowledge of this frame is prerequisite for further Pauline studies, Munck has succeeded in a matter more important than his failure to defend his particular theories.

PARTNERSHIP IN THE LEASE OF CULTS IN GREEK ANTIQUITY

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We are in possession of a number of documents (inscriptions and papyri) relating to the lease of priesthoods in Greece and Egypt, dating from the fifth century B.C. to late Roman times. That curious practice, similar in some respect to the holding of Church benefices in the Middle Ages, has been studied by different scholars, but without agreement on many substantial points.[1] Before the second World War K. Wilhelmson and M. Segre dedicated very important studies to the problem, advancing considerably the interpretation of the sources.[2] In my Lois Sacrées of Asia Minor I collected many specimens of these documents and tried my best to promote their understanding.[3] But nobody has sought to link the sale of cults in Greece with the same practice, as it is well attested through the papyri, in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt.[4] Meanwhile the inscriptions and the papyri, put together, not only fill the lacunas existing in both fields of documentation, but contribute to elucidate the legal side of the practice itself. With the recent publication of the study of M. Talamanca on auction in the classical world, the task has now become easier.[5] Unfortu-

[1] H. Herbrecht, De sacerdotii apud Graecos emptione, venditione, Diss. Argent., 1885, p. 36. Bruchman, Philol. Anz., 1885, p. 442 foll. B. Lehmann, Quaestiones sacerdotales, Königsberg, 1888, p. 8 foll. Heller, De Cariae Lydiaeque sacerdotibus, Leipzig, 1891, p. 228 foll. Gaebler, Erythrae, Berlin, 1892, p. 71 foll. Bischoff, Rh. Mus. LIV, 1889, p. 9 foll. W. Otto, Priester und Tempel, Leipzig-Berlin, 1908, I p. 230 foll.

[2] K. Wilhelmson, Zum römischen Fiscalkauf in Ägypten, Acta et commentationes Universitatis Tartuensis XVIII, 1930, pp. 1–12. M. Segre, Osservazioni epigraphiche sulla vendita di sacerdozio, Rendic. Ist. Lombardo LXIX, 1936, p. 821 foll., LXX, 1937, pp. 83–105.

[3] Lois Sacrées de l'Asie Mineure, Paris, 1955, n^{os} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 25, 37, 38, 47, 48, 49, 52, 56, 63, 66, 71, 73.

[4] W. Otto does not think that the Greek practice was transferred to Egypt, o. c. I, p. 244, n. 1–3. But it could derive from a common source, viz. the Persian administration, as some Aramaic papyri seem to suggest.

[5] Contributi allo studio delle vendite all' asta nel mondo classico, Atti della Accademia dei Lincei CCCLI, 1954.

nately the author does not utilize the abundant epigraphical material on our subject. I should like to endeavor to supply in part this need.

The lease of cults in Greece is termed in the inscriptions *πρᾶσις*, *ἐπίπρασις*, *συνίστασις*, *διασύστασις*. On the meaning of these terms different opinions have been held, the second one in particular has remained in dispute. I shall pass over the first comments on the inscriptions in question, because their authors did not have the benefit of specialist help from the field of ancient law. Segre before disclosing his own opinion lists six conclusions to be drawn from the texts and states that the *ἐπίπρασις* was a double sale (doppia vendita). It was lawful in antiquity, he thinks, to outbid any time the lease negotiated by the state and a private person, and to rescind the contract. The state could sell the leased cult offices more than once if third persons offered a higher bid.[6] Wilhelmson shares the same opinion in relation to the sale of the cult posts in Roman Egypt.[7] The particularity of such a sale would derive from the precarious character of the purchasing in auction from the fiscus. According to Talamanca, only the office of hereditary prophet could not be outbidden, but those not hereditary, once purchased, could be released again at any time, if a higher price was proposed.[8] The cancelling of a contract in such a circumstance would derive not from a general principle of law, but from the special rule on non-hereditary posts.

The explanations of Wilhelmson, Segre and Talamanca seem to me to be contrary to the principle of inalienability in relation to acquired goods, a rule respected so deeply in ancient law. Who could be willing to purchase something from the state under a condition of uncertainty? [9] In the famous excerpts of Theophrastus we read: *κυρία ἡ ὠνὴ καὶ πρᾶσις . . . ὅταν ἡ τιμὴ δοθῇ καὶ*

[6] "Il sacerdozio in *ἐπίπρασις* non fosse venduto per un periodo fisso di tempo, ma in qualunque momento chi volesse acquistarlo potesse provocare un' asta; se allora l'attuale possessore ci teneva a conservarlo, faceva salire il prezzo ad un valore di poco inferiore a quella che aveva pagato la volta precedente, e tale che-nessun concorrente si sentisse di pagare." O. c., p. 103.

[7] O. c., p. 9–11.

[8] O. c., pp. 203, 205.

[9] The question is put by the editors of The Ox. Pap. XX, 1952, p. 145.

τὰ ἐκ τοῦ νόμον ποιήσουσι.[10] The same rule figures in the Ptolemaic ordinance concerning the sale of cult offices: τὰς ἠγορασμένας προφητείας καὶ γέρα . . . ὧν αἱ τιμαὶ τεταγμέναι εἰσίν, μένειν τοῖς ἱεροῖς κυρίως.[11]

In the instructions of the Idios Logos we find two items relating to the lease of prophet office: 77 and 78.[12] The first one guarantees to the γένος the hereditary posts; the meaning of the second is not clear. According to the opinion of a majority of scholars, the rule in question bars the procedure of the sale by auction. Indeed, as Uxkull-Gyllenband points out, we do not have contracts of sale of the office of prophet after 123 A.D. But earlier the practice was frequent.

The term ἐπίπρασις is very often encountered in the records of priesthood sales in Erythrae (third century B.C.). If we look on the list of transactions, we note 24 cases of πρᾶσις and 34 of ἐπίπρασις.[13] The prices of the latter are lower, and frequently half or less in comparison with those of the πρᾶσις. In two cases the ἐπίπρασις brings one-half and one-fourth of the πρᾶσις.[14] Many of the purchasers share ownership in two, three or five cults.[15] In case of transfer of priesthood through ἐπίπρασις the name of the first owner is mentioned, which means that he remained always primarily liable toward the state. I think, therefore, that the transaction of ἐπίπρασις was an afterlease or a sale of the share in the ownership. The particle ἐπί does not mean "overbidding" at auction but "sale on percent rate." [16] This inference is explicitly strengthened by the following passage of the inscription of Erythrae: εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἱερεὺς ἐπιπωλεῖται, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιμ, πωλεῖται.[17] In the case of a priest owing the office, the

[10] Cf. F. Pringsheim, The Greek Law of Sale, Weimar, 1950, p. 136.

[11] Pap. Tebt. I, 5, 88.

[12] Uxkull-Gyllenband, Idios Logos, Ägypt. Urk. V, 2, 1934, p. 83:
αἱ ἐπὶ διαδοχῇ προφητεῖαι τῷ γένει φυλάσσονται,
αἱ δὲ πραθεῖσαι ψειλῶς καὶ μὴ ἐφ' αἱρέσει πραταί εἰσιν.

[13] Syll³. 1014. Lois Sacrées n° 25. Cf. below the list of cults.

[14] Ll. 157–163; 160–165.

[15] Heniochos: 8, 119. Polypeithes: 28, 69. Pythocles: 32, 36. Iatrocles: 39, 139. Damasistratos: 19–21. Metrodoros: 49, 166. Aristeas: 67, 71, 83. Phyliscos: 81, 127, 129. Hecatonymos: 85, 163. Molion: 97, 106, 115. Dionysodoros: 158, 180.

[16] Cf. Arch, Papf. IV, 390 n° 244, 11; V, 390, n° 11.

[17] L. 120.

transaction cannot be termed a "transfer of ownership," but an "admittance to a partnership."

The same conclusion is to be drawn from other inscriptions. The purchaser of a certain priesthood in Chalcedon (third century B.C.) pays for the office 7500 dr., plus proportionate amounts to six other priests.[18] In my Lois Sacrées I suggested it was perhaps a cumulative priesthood, embracing several cults, which was bought. It seems more likely to be a case of a few persons sharing in the ownership of one cult. The purchaser before entering upon his office must pay off other priests who shared the post in question with its former holder. The assumption of partnership makes the document more comprehensible. An inscription of Andros reports to us another case of sharing in the ownership of priesthood.[19] A certain citizen received from the authorities for his merits some privilege in relation to the cult of Athena Tauropolos. Segre thinks it was an honorary priesthood which was granted. I should like to suppose, the award was accompanied by real partnership in holding the priestly office. Indeed, the man honored partook in the cult revenue with a vicar-priest on a certain percentage (one-third or one-fourth).[20] There was, therefore, a partnership of duties and profit between two men, one of whom possibly enjoyed ownership of priesthood for life.

Partnership in holding the priesthood is sometimes not expressed, but indicated by certain features of arrangement. The purchaser of the priesthood of Dionysos Thyllophoros in Cos (third century B.C.) has the right to appoint a vicar-priestess in the demes. There was certainly a written or spoken agreement between them concerning the partition of income.[21] The priestess of Dionysos in Miletus receives a certain amount of money from the woman who presides over the initiations in the name of the first.[22] The payment was made in consequence of an arrangement be-

[18] Lois Sacrées n⁰ 3: priest of Gods of Samothrace 250 dr., of Heracles 106 5/12 dr., three other priests 37½ dr. each.

[19] I G XII, 5, 721. Th. Saucius, Andros, Sonderschr. Oester. Arch. Inst. VII, 1914, p. 125 foll. M. Segre, o. c. pp. 89–96.

[20] L. 7–8.

[21] Leg. Gr. Sacr. II, 132. Cf. M. Segre, o. c. p. 829.

[22] Lois Sacrées n⁰ 48, 20.

tween the priestess in chief and her deputy. In cults where the priest and priestess functioned together, an apportionment of the income was prescribed for each officiant.[23] The partnership in some cases gave to the purchaser the right to appoint or introduce a priest for service. So the lessee of the priesthood of Artemis Pergaia in Halicarnassus had to provide (*παρέχειν*) the priestess.[24] When the cult of Roma was established in Miletus, the lessee of the priesthood had to introduce (*ἀπογράφειν*) to the authorities the priest for duties, who was to officiate three years and eight months or find a deputy in his place.[25] In Magnesia on the Maeander the founder of the cult of Sarapis appointed an officiating priest.[26] Certainly, in all these cases there must have existed some kind of contractual arrangement between the persons in question. It may be that the office of the priest of *θεοὶ πάντες* was in reality a partnership in owing many or all cults in the city, as the sharing and the apportionment of the income would suggest.[27] Finally, in certain cases not the priesthood itself but the honorary dignity of being priest was put on sale. The lessee of the priesthood of Gods of Samothrace in Tomi officiated only on rare and solemn occasions.[28] Because such an honor was usually acquired by rich men, we can doubt if there existed between them and the priests on duty a contractual partnership.

Another term denoting the partnership in holding the priesthood is the verb *συνιστάναι*. It is supposed to figure in the inscription of Sinope, concerning the lease of the priesthood of Poseidon Heliconios.[29] On the stone only the particle *συν* is preserved, but certain reasons recommend the suppletion *συν[ιστάναι*. The word *μερισμός* in the same text seems to point to a regulation concerning the partnership. The associated partner had to perform cult duties according to the arrangement, as for the income he received from the private sacrifices the *πρότμησις* or the

[23] Leg. Gr. Sacr. 44, 6.
[24] Lois Sacrées n° 73, 6.
[25] Lois Sacrées n° 49, 4–12.
[26] O. c. n° 34, 9–10.
[27] Cf. o. c. n° 56, 22 and p. 144.
[28] Leg. Gr. Sacr. II, 84, 9–12.
[29] Lois Sacrées n° 1, 2. Cf. L. Wenger, Die Stellvertretung im Rechte der Papyri, Leipzig, 1906, p. 219.

ὠμοπλάτη. This choice of pieces indicates the partition or sharing between two men. The verb συνιστάναι figures in the fragmentary inscription of Lesbos in honor of a certain Potamon, the priest of θεοὶ πάντες of the city and surroundings.[30] The document mentions the merits of the man and of his descendants sharing in the priesthood with their father (συνστασάμενοι). Although the text is small and badly preserved, we have no reason to doubt that the members of the family had a partnership in cults.

When the father transferred his priesthood or a share of it to his son, such a transaction is called διασύστασις. It means originally the admission to the partnership with a right to succeed. So Athenaios in Pergame was permitted by Attalus III to be partner of his father in holding the office of priest of Dionysos Kathegemon.[31] He at first helped his aged parent in performing the cult duties, and later succeeded him. In Erythrae a certain Damosistratos transfers his shares in five different cults to his son Hecatonymos.[32] Because the father shared partnership with somebody else, the name of this man is mentioned in the record. The transfer of ownership could be done by testament. The priesthood of Aphrodite Pythochrestos in Erythrae bought by a certain Aristomenes for 140 dr. and inherited later by his wife and son, was transferred to another son in the procedure of διασύστασις.[33] The heir of Aristomenes, Dionysodoros figures as a guarantor in the transaction. It seems that he shared with his mother the hereditary priesthood before it was transferred to his brother. At the same time he was partner in the cult of Hera Teleia.[34]

The partnership in the lease of cult offices is well attested in Egypt in Ptolemaic and Roman times. I should like to discuss here certain papyri relating to this practice which seem to be based on the same legal principle as in Greece. In the light of inscriptions the papyri can be better commented upon. According to Pap. Tebt. 296 a certain Harthotes purchased in 121 A.D. the office of prophet for 6000 dr. He had already paid two in-

[30] Hiller von Gaertringen, Nachr. Gött. Gesell. Wiss. I, 1934–1936, p. 122.
[31] C. B. Welles, Royal Corr. nos 65, 66.
[32] O. c. n° 25, 15–22.
[33] O. c. n° 25, 179–192.
[34] O. c. n° 25, 158.

stalments of the price, 1500 dr. each. But, as is recorded at the end of the document, a certain Marsisouchos paid in 122 A.D. to the fiscus 1500 dr. and to the former purchaser another 1500 dr. In 123 Harthotes paid 3000 dr. and took the office. In another papyrus, SB 8749, Marsisouchos is recorded as having paid 3000 dr. of the "doubled price" for the same post. We see a contradiction in the documents relating to the same transaction. Talamanca supposes that Marsisouchos outbid Harthotes in 122, paying the instalments in part to the fiscus and in part to his competitor. The latter's contract was rescinded because of a higher bid. But next year Harthotes outbid Marsisouchos again in the same fashion. Such a cancelling of contract was legal and possible, according to Talamanca, because the office in question was not hereditary.[35] I should like to think that both men shared the same post. If we count over the payments, Marsisouchos paid 3000 dr. and Harthotes 4500 dr., 1500 of which was a doubled instalment, perhaps because the date of payment was not kept. Both men having partnership were jointly responsible to the state.

We have another papyrus of a somewhat later date on the same sale, Pap. Tebt. 295. Marsisouchos now shares the partnership with a certain Harpocration. The latter paid 100 dr. in one unspecified year of Hadrian. In the eighth year of the same emperor, Marsisouchos paid 200 dr. Two years later the same man outbade the office in auction for 520 dr. The partnership was soon dissolved, it seems, because the first sharer withdrew from the business.

The partnership in the lease of cult offices in Egypt seems to be frequent enough. We find in the papyri mention of ownership of some parts of the office of *lesones*, of temples and even altars.[36]

The cults were usually purchased for a certain time, but quite often for life or perpetually to be inherited in the family. The post of priest of Asclepios in Miletus (first century A.D.) was sold for 50 years and became hereditary during this period.[37] The change from non-hereditary to hereditary priesthood is recorded

[35] O. c. p. 202.
[36] Cf. BGU III, 719, 10; 734, II, 7; 916; Pap. Tebt. I, 14.
[37] Lois Sacrées n° 52, A 12.

in Pap. Tebt. 294 of 147/8 A. D., Pakebkis, the son of Marsisouchos, mentioned above, bought the office of prophet for 2200 dr. for himself and for his descendants. The priesthood of Asclepios in Pergamon before 133 B.C. was given to Asclepiades and his family forever.[38] The lessee of the similar priesthood in Chalcedon (first century A.D.) is warned to take on lease the office for himself or for his son only, but not for another person.[39] This reservation aims to limit the afterlease and the partnership. On the other hand, the afterlease of the priesthood of Meter in Chalcedon (third century B.C.) is explicitly allowed.[40] It naturally developed that the offices were transferred from parents to sons and slowly many priesthoods became hereditary. Perhaps for this reason we hear little of the sale of cult offices in Egypt since the middle of the second century A.D. Uxkull-Gyllenband and Talamanca think that the ordinance of the Idios Logos abolished the practice of leasing the office of prophet.[41] But the same regulations permit the sale by auction of the *stolistes* posts. The word αἵρεσις on which the scholars mentioned base their opinion, does not mean necessarily "auction," but "will, preference, condition." [42] Consequently the rule in question can mean: the offices of prophet sold without reservation can be leased again (for partnership).

We have two excellent papers on partnership in lease, written by Professor Taubenschlag.[43] He analyzes the use from the standpoint of ancient law and brings many examples of sharing the contracts between the state and the private partners and between the privates themselves. Such a partnership called μετοχή, κοινωνία, was concluded on certain percent rate (ἐπὶ τὸ . . . μέρος). The names of the partners must be submitted to the authorities, but the first lessee is always mentioned in the record because he was primarily responsible to the state. Sometimes in such an

[38] O. c. nº 13, 10–11.
[39] O. c. nº 3, 11–13.
[40] O. c. nº 4, 19–20. The suppletion μετὰ τὰ]ν κ[ύρωσιν is recommendable.
[41] O. c. pp. 84–85.
[42] Cf. C. B. Welles, Royal Corr. p. 310.
[43] Die societas negotiationis im Rechte der Papyri, Zt. Sav. Stift. LII, 1932, p. 64 foll. Afterpacht und Aftermiete im Rechte der Papyri, ibidem LIII, 1935, p. 234 foll. Cf. The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the plight of the Papyri², 1955, pp. 385–393.

arrangement a payment called διάπεισμα is made to the lessor. Perhaps for these reasons the prices of the ἐπίπρασις in Erythrae are not always round fractions of those of the πρᾶσις. In certain contracts afterlease and partnership are not allowed, in others we find clauses in favor of the lessor or of his descendants. In the case of death or incapacity of the lessee the right passed on to his children.

The partnership was not limited to the offices of priest, in the same way the leases of temples, shrines, altars and other small cult revenue could be shared.[44] The general rule was, that the purchaser has the right to admit partners, if such a faculty was not barred by contract. Because the afterlease was usually submitted to the state to be approved, the procedure could take place sometimes by auction. But the right of the first lessee was not cancelled nor the contract rescinded, if he himself did not withdraw. I do not think therefore that the ἐπίπρασις of priesthoods in Erythrae and the similar procedure in Egypt were ordinary examples of outbidding in auction. The frequent sales of priestshoods in Greece and in Egypt can be explained as an admission to partnership.

[44] SB 5252; BGU 916; Arch. Papf. II, 139. Cf. W. Otto. o. c. I, p. 394–395, II, p. 115.

LEASE AND AFTERLEASE OF THE CULTS IN ERYTHRAE

Cult	*Lease*	*Afterlease*		*Heredity*
Ablabiai	400			
Agathe Tyche		200[1]	100	
Alexander	1000[1]			
Apollon Kaukaseus, Artemis Kaukasis, Apollon Lykeios, Delios, Aleon				270
Apollon Enagonios		230		
Apollon in Koiloi	910			
Apollon in Saberidai		150		
Aphrodite in Embato				2040
Aphrodite Pandemos		200		
Aphrodite Pythochrestos	130			130
" "	300			
Artemis Phosphoros		50[1]		
Athena Nike		120		
Athena Phemia, Zeus Phemios		140		
Athena Phemia			70	
Demeter, Kore	190			
Demeter, Kore Pythochrestos		210		
Demeter Chloe		101	60	
Demeter in Kolonai		600		
" "	1300			
Dionysos	80			
Dionysos Bakcheus		100		
Dionysos Pythochrestos		105		
Dioskouroi	500	200[1]		
Enyo,Enyalios		70		
Eirene		500		
Ge		10		
Hera Teleia	500[1]	251		
Heracles		1921		
Hermes Agoraios		4610	4600	
Hermes Pylios		270		
Hestia Boulaia	930			
Hestia Temenia	200[1]	100[1]	105	

[1] m.th. = more than.

Cult	*Lease*	*Afterlease*	*Heredity*
Kore Soteira	302		
Korybantes, Euphranieioi Thaleioi	601		
Korybantes Thaleioi Andreioi	180	171	
Meter Megale	480		
Plouton Epimachos		200	
Poseidon Phytalmios	136		
Theoi Prokyklioi	400	105	
Thetis, Achilles, Nereides	80		
Zeus Apotropaios, Athena Apotropaia		181	
" " " "	150(?)		
" " " "	52(?)		
Zeus Basileus	230		
Zeus Eleutherios		300	
" "	1000[1]		
Zeus Philios		1300	
?	820	810	
?		200[1]	
?		100[1]	

[1] m.th. = more than.

NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES IN THE CHURCH FATHERS AND THE GNOSTIC BASILIDES *

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BY THE TIME the Fathers of the Church began to offer negation as a solution of the problem of divine attributes, the theory of negative attributes had already been dealt with by Philo, Albinus, and Plotinus. All three of them, starting with the assumption that God is ineffable, found that one way of describing God was by means of negative attributes. In their treatment of this type of attributes, however, there is a difference between Philo on the one hand and Albinus and Plotinus on the other.

In Philo, the use of negative attributes in the description of God, such as describing God as being invisible, incomprehensible, unnamable, ineffable, and the like, is presented only as a way of expressing the scriptural principle of the unlikeness between God and all other beings.[1] In contradistinction to his own treatment of affirmative attributes, which is cast by him in a framework of the Aristotelian theories of logical propositions and predicables,[2] Philo's treatment of negative attributes is free of any logical implications.

In Albinus and Plotinus, however, negative attributes are treated after the manner of Aristotle's logical propositions of the negative quality.[3] To begin with, corresponding to the term "negation" (*ἀπόφασις*) in its technical sense as used by Aristotle in contrast to the term "privation" (*στέρησις*), both Albinus and Plotinus use the term "remotion" (*ἀφαίρεσις*). Then, the contrast between "remotion" (or "negation") and "privation" is conceived of by them, after Aristotle and his commentator Alexander, as a contrast between a proposition in which the opposite

* This paper was originally written for a special issue of the Ricerche Religiose planned to be published in February, 1953, in honor of Professor George LaPiana. The plan for the publication of that issue was subsequently abandoned.

[1] Cf. my Philo, II, p. 98 ff., 126 ff.

[2] Ibid., pp. 130 ff.

[3] Cf. my paper "Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes," Harvard Theological Review, 45 (1952), 115–130.

of the predicate negated can under no conceivable circumstances be affirmed of the subject and a proposition in which the opposite of the predicate negated can under certain conceivable circumstances be affirmed of the subject. Accordingly, with reference to God, both Albinus and Plotinus maintain that the negation of any predicate of God does not mean that its opposite can be predicated of Him; it rather means the exclusion of God from the universe of discourse of the predicate in question. In other words, the negative attributes of God are what Aristotle calls technically "negations" and not what he calls technically "privations." Then also, to both Albinus and Plotinus negations can be expressed not only by propositions which are negative in quality, such as "God is not divisible," but also by propositions which are affirmative in quality but in which the predicate is negative in form, such as "God is indivisible." Moreover, to both Albinus and Plotinus, God may be described not only by predicates which are negative in form, such as "indivisible," but also by predicates which, though positive in form, are understood to be negative in meaning, as when, for instance, the term "simple" is understood to mean "indivisible." Then, further, in Plotinus, negation in the sense of being excluded from the universe of discourse of certain predicates may be expressed by saying that God is "before" or "beyond" or "above" those predicates. He thus says that God is "neither what is movable nor what is at rest," because He is "before (*πρό*) motion and before rest," [4] and also that He "neither knows anything nor is there anything of which He is ignorant," [5] because He is beyond (*ἐπέκεινα*) thought and knowledge,[6] and similarly that He "has neither the not-good nor the good," [7] because "He is above good (*ὑπεράγαθον*)." [8] Finally, in Albinus, the method of forming a conception of God as well as describing God by negation is compared to the method of our forming the conception as well as the definition of a mathematical point. "The first method of forming a conception of God," he says, "will be by the remotion (*ἀφαίρεσιν*) of these [sensible

[4] Enn. VI, 9, 3 (ed. E. Bréhier, ll. 42, 44).
[5] Ibid. VI, 9, 6 (48–49).
[6] Ibid. V, 6, 6 (31 ff.).
[7] Ibid. V, 5, 13 (5).
[8] Ibid. VI, 9, 6 (40).

predicates from God], in the same way as we form a conception of a point by its abstraction (*ἀφαίρεσιν*), from the sensible, namely, by first forming the conception of a surface, then that of a line, and finally that of a point." [9] In this passage, as we have tried to explain elsewhere,[10] Albinus means to show that God is to be described negatively in the same way as a point is defined by Euclid negatively as that "which has no part." [11]

These two methods of dealing with negative attributes, namely, the Philonic method of using negation only as an expression of the scriptural principle of the unlikeness of God with other beings and the Albino-Plotinian method of using negation in the Aristotelian technical sense of negative propositions, are to be found in the Church Fathers. Here we shall give a few representative illustrations of the latter kind of use of negation by the Church Fathers, with which we shall contrast, on one point, the use of negation by Basilides.

In Clement of Alexandria's treatment of the problem of divine attributes we have a typical example of the combination of Philo and Albinus and Aristotle. Reflecting Philo's statements that, on account of the scriptural doctrine of the unlikeness of God, anthropomorphic expressions in Scripture are to be understood as having been introduced "for the instruction of the many (*τῶν πολλῶν*)" [12] and are not to be taken literally but rather figuratively,[13] Clement starts out his discussion of divine attributes by stating that "the most of men (*οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων*)" think of God after the analogy of themselves and, in the course of his discussion, he reminds his readers that the anthropomorphic appellations in Scriptures were not taken by "the Hebrews" literally but that "certain of these appellations were used more piously in an allegorical sense." [14] Then, as he goes on, he intimates that besides those appellations which are to be taken allegorically there are others which are to be taken negatively and, paraphrasing Albinus, he tries to show how, by a process

[9] Didaskalikos, X, 5 (ed. Fr. Dübner, p. 239, ll. 19–23; ed. P. Lewis, p. 61).
[10] Cf. "Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes," op. cit., pp. 118–119.
[11] Euclid, Elements, I, Def. 1.
[12] Immut. 11, 54.
[13] Sacr. 30, 101.
[14] Strom. V, 11[68] (PG 9, 104 AB).

of abstraction like that by which we arrive at the conceptions of surface and line and point we may also arrive at some conception of God, namely "knowing not what He is but what He is not." [15] But in the course of his discussion, after describing the manner of arriving at the conception of point, which, as we have said, alludes to Euclid's negative definition of point, he adds: "For the point which remains is a unit (*μονὰς*), so to speak, having position, from which, if we take away position, there is the conception of unit." [16] This additional statement about a "unit" reflects Aristotle's negative definition of "unit" as that "which is not divisible in any dimension and is without position." [17]

A greater use of the Albino-Plotinian method of treatment of negative attributes is to be found in Gregory of Nyssa. In one passage he says that "we either convey the idea of goodness by the negation (*ἀποφάσεως*) of badness, or *vice versa* by the remotion (*ἀφαιρέσει*) of the good we convey the idea of the bad." [18] Here, like Albinus and Plotinus, he uses the term *aphairesis* as the equivalent of the term *apophasis*. In another passage he indicates that, again like Albinus and Plotinus, he takes propositions which are affirmative in form but in which the predicates are terms with alpha privative to be the equivalent of negative propositions, for he says that the proposition "God is incorruptible" means that "in the incorruptible corruption is not found," [19] that is to say, it is the equivalent of the proposition "God is not corruptible." In still another passage, after stating that the divine nature is ineffable,[20] he continues as follows: "Wherefore, in order that the superexcellent nature should not seem to have any relationship with these things below, in attempting to describe the divine nature, we have made use of notions and words which separate it from them," such, for instance, as the terms "pretemporal" (*προαιώνιον*), "beginningless" (*ἄναρχον*), "end-

[15] Ibid. V, 11^{71} (108 B–109 A). On this analogy between Clement and Albinus, see H. Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum VII, 42 (1953), p. 429, n. 4.
[16] Ibid. (109 A).
[17] Metaph. V, 6, 1016b, 25.
[18] De Anima et Resurrectione (PG 46, 40 B).
[19] Cont. Eunom. XII (PG 45, 953 BC).
[20] Ibid. (1104 B).

less" (*ἀτελεύτητον*), and similar other terms formed with alpha privative.[21] From his inclusion of the term *προαιώνιον* in this list it may be inferred that, like Plotinus, he treated terms with the Greek prefix *pro* as the equivalent of terms with the Greek alpha privative. But evidently being aware that there was some question, as we shall see,[22] whether affirmative propositions in which the predicates are terms with alpha privative are to be considered as privations or as negations, he says, after his enumeration of the above-mentioned examples of such predicates, that all those who are so inclined may coin similar other predicates, "calling them privatives (*στερητικά*) or remotives (*ἀφαιρετικά*) or whatever pleases them." [23] What he means to say is that, whatever others may think of propositions with such predicates, he follows Plotinus in regarding them as negations. Finally, like Albinus and Plotinus, he allows to affirm of God even terms which are positive in form, provided they are taken to have a negative meaning. He thus says: "It amounts to the same whether we speak of God as 'unsusceptible (*ἀνεπίδεκτον*) of evil' or whether we call Him 'good,' whether we confess that 'He is immortal (*ἀθάνατον*)' or whether we say that 'He ever liveth,' for we understand no difference in the sense of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though one may seem to convey the notion of affirmation (*θέσιν*) and the other of negation (*ἀναίρεσιν*)." [24]

A similar use of the Albino-Plotinian method of treatment of negative attributes is to be found in pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and, following him, John of Damascus. The direct source of Dionysius, we may assume, was Plotinus.

To begin with, like Plotinus, Dionysius uses the term *aphairesis* in the sense of negation. Thus in a passage, in which he begins with the statement that "it is not possible either to express or to conceive what the One . . . is," [25] he concludes with the statement that "the godlike minds . . . celebrate Him most ap-

[21] Ibid. (1104 D–1105 A).
[22] Cf. below at nn. 52–57.
[23] Cont. Eunom. XII (1105 A).
[24] Ibid. (953 D).
[25] De Divinis Nominibus I, 5 (PG 3, 593 B).

propriately through the remotion (ἀφαιρέσεως) of all things." [26] Such a "remotion," as in Plotinus, is expressed by him in two ways: (1) by negative propositions, such as, for instance, "God is not a body" or that "He is not in place" or that "He is not seen," [27] and the like, and (2) by affirmative propositions in which the predicate is prefixed by alpha privative, such, for instance, as "God is inconceivable (ἀδιανόητος)" or "ineffable (ἄῤῥητος)" [28] or "invisible (ἀόρατος)" or "incomprehensible (ἀπερίληπτος)," [29] and the like.

In John of Damascus the same view is expressed in the following passage: "In the case of God, however, it is impossible to explain what He is in essence, and it befits us the rather to hold discourse about his remotion (ἀφαιρέσεως) from all things." [30] Elsewhere these discourses about God by means of "remotion" are said by him to be discourses "by means of 'negation' " (ἀποφαντικῶς).[31] He furthermore indicates that this negation may be expressed either by an affirmative proposition in which the predicate has as its prefix an alpha privative, such as "God is incorruptible," or by a negative proposition such as "God is not corruptible." He thus says: "Further the terms beginningless, incorruptible, unbegotten, as also uncreated, incorporeal, unseeable, and so forth, explain what He is not, that is to say, they tell us that His existence had no beginning, that He is not corruptible, nor created, nor corporeal, nor visible." [32]

Then, again like Plotinus, Dionysius tries to show that by remotion he means here the absolute exclusion of God from the universe of the predicates in question. Thus in a passage, in which he started by saying that it is our duty to negate (ἀποφάσκειν) all attributes of the One, he proceeds to say that we are "not to consider the negations (ἀποφάσεις) to be in opposition to the affirmations (καταφάσεσιν), but far rather that the One, which is above every remotion (ἀφαίρεσιν) and affirmation

[26] Ibid. (593 BC).
[27] De Mystica Theologia IV (PG 3, 1040 D).
[28] De Divin. Nomin. 1, 1 (PG 3, 588 B).
[29] Ibid. I, 2 (588 C).
[30] De Fide Orthodoxa I, 4 (PG 94, 800 B).
[31] Ibid. I, 12 (845 C).
[32] Ibid. I, 9 (837 A B).

(*θέσιν*), is above privations (*στερήσεις*)." [33] In this passage, we take it, alluding to Aristotle's distinction between "negation" and "privation" and using the terms *apophasis* and *aphairesis* indiscriminately, Dionysius tries to show that negative attributes in the case of God are to be taken not as the negation of an opposite but rather as the exclusion from the universe of a discourse. In another place he expresses the same view in his terse statement that God is "the affirmation of all, the remotion of all, that which is above all affirmation and remotion." [34] This conception of "negation" or "remotion" in the sense of the exclusion from a universe of discourse is sometimes described by him as a "preëminent remotion" (*ὑπεροχικὴ ἀφαίρεσις*).[35]

In John of Damascus the same view is expressed in his own explanation of what he means by the phrase "His remotion from all things." It means, he says, that God "does not belong to the class of existing things, not that He is as nonexistent, but that He is above all existing things, nay even above existence itself." [36] Similarly, speaking of such divine predicates as "unsubstantial, timeless, beginningless, invisible," he says that all such terms mean "not that God is inferior to anything or lacking in anything . . . but that He preëminently surpasses (*ὑπεροχικῶς . . . ἐξῄρηται*) all things, for He is not one of the things that exist, but over all things." [37]

Finally, while negative attributes are those by which, as Dionysius says, God can be celebrated "most appropriately," still, like Philo, as well as Albinus and Plotinus, he believes that God must also be celebrated by certain positive attributes, seeing that we cannot directly negate of God such terms as those which, when used with reference to us, express certain perfections. For, he argues in effect, while it can be said that God "is not a body, nor has shape, or form, or quality, or quantity, or bulk; nor is in a place, nor is seen, nor has sensible contact, nor perceives, nor is perceived by the senses, nor has disorder and confusion, as being vexed by earthly passions, nor is powerless, as being sub-

[33] De Myst. Theol. I, 2 (1000 B).
[34] De Divin. Nomin. II, 4 (641 A).
[35] Ibid. II, 3 (640 B).
[36] De Fide Orth. I, 4 (800 B).
[37] Ibid. I, 12 (845 C D).

ject to casualties of sense," still it cannot be said that "He is unsubstantial or lifeless or irrational or unintelligent." [38] God must inevitably be described as "substantial," "living," "rational," "intelligent," and the like. But all such affirmative attributes, he explains after Philo [39] and Albinus and Plotinus,[40] are to be taken to express a causal relation between God and the world.[41] But, in addition to this, all these positive attributes, when combined with the prefix *hyper*, may, as in Plotinus, acquire the logical significance of negation, in the sense of exclusion from a universe of discourse. "The names, then, common to the whole Deity," he says, . . . "are the super-good (*ὑπεράγαθον*), the super-God (*ὑπέρθεον*), the super-substantial (*ὑπερούσιον*), the super-living (*ὑπέρζωον*), the super-wise (*ὑπέρσοφον*), and whatever else belongs to the preëminent remotion." [42] Moreover, again as in Plotinus, the prefix *hyper* must not necessarily be actually expressed. Any laudatory terms, though positive in form, may be predicated of God, provided they are understood to be used in a preëminent sense and indirectly in a negative sense. Thus referring to the passage which we have just quoted, Dionysius says: "In the treatise *De Divinis Nominibus* [I have set forth] how He is named good, how He is named being, how He is named life and wisdom and power, and whatever belongs to the intelligible nomenclature of God." [43]

In John of Damascus the same view is expressed in a passage, where, after explaining the significance of negative attributes, he says: "But there are other terms which are predicated of God affirmatively," [44] such, for instance, as "being," "substance," "cause," "reason," "rational," "life," "living," "power," "powerful," [45] and the like. Such terms, he explains, mean to express a causal relation between God and the world.[46] He then goes on to say: "But the sweetest names are a combination of both [that

[38] De Myst. Theol. IV (1040 D).
[39] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 133 ff.
[40] Cf. "Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes," op. cit., pp. 121 ff.
[41] De Divin. Nomin. I, 5 (593 C D); De Myst. Theol. I, 2 (1000 B), et passim.
[42] De Divin. Nomin. II, 3 (640 B).
[43] De Myst. Theol. III (1033 A).
[44] De Fide Orth. I, 12 (848 A).
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid. I, 12 (848 B); cf. I, 9 (836 A).

is, of both affirmation and negation], for example, the super-substantial (ὑπερούσιος) substance, the super-divine (ὑπέρθεος) Divinity, the super-principial (ὑπεράρχιος) principle, and the like. Further, there are some affirmations about God which have the force of a preëminent negation (ὑπεροχικῆς ἀποφάσεως), as, for example, darkness, for this does not imply that God is dark and not light, but rather that He is above light." [47]

In all the discussions of attributes, from Philo to John of Damascus, an affirmative proposition, in which the term "God" is the subject and some adjective prefixed by the alpha privative, or by its Latin equivalent the inseparable particle *in*, is the predicate, has the value of a negative proposition in the sense of the exclusion of the subject from the universe of discourse of the predicate. Thus to all of them, one can say not only "God is not effable" but also "God is ineffable," and the meaning of the latter proposition would be the exclusion of God from the universe of discourse of effability.

A view quite the opposite of this is reported by Hippolytus in the name of the Gnostic Basilides. "For, he says," writes Hippolytus, "that which is named [ineffable] is not absolutely ineffable, since we call one thing ineffable and another not even ineffable. For that which is not even ineffable is not named ineffable, but is, he says, above every name that is named." [48]

In this statement, then, Basilides is represented as agreeing with Plotinus and the Fathers on two points but disagreeing with them on a third point. He agrees with them that, whatever term is predicated of God, it must be predicated of Him as a negation in the sense of His exclusion from the universe of discourse of that predicate. Then he also agrees with them that such a negation may be expressed by affirming that God is above some particular predicate. But he disagrees with them as to whether such a negation can be also expressed by an affirmative proposition with a negative predicate, such as "God is ineffable." According to Plotinus and the Fathers, such a negation can be expressed by a proposition of this type. According to Basilides, a proposition like "God is ineffable" does not express such a

[47] Ibid. (848 B); cf. I, 4 (800 C).
[48] Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium VII, 20, 3 (ed. P. Wendland).

negation, or, as he puts it, it does not mean "absolutely ineffable." In order to express such a negation, he contends, one would have to say "God is not even ineffable." The point at issue between them, then, is that, according to Plotinus and the Fathers, an affirmative proposition in which the predicate is negative in form is the equivalent of what Aristotle calls a negative proposition, whereas, according to Basilides, it is the equivalent of what Aristotle calls a privative proposition.

We may ask ourselves, what is the cause of this difference?

The cause of this difference, it seems to us, may be found in a difference in the interpretation of Aristotle.

The distinction between "privation" and "negation," to which there is a definite allusion in Aristotle,[49] has been illustrated by Alexander of Aphrodisias by two examples. The example for "privation" is an affirmative proposition of which the predicate is a term which is negative only in meaning but not in form, such as the proposition "A is blind." In this case, the subject A must be some one who could naturally possess sight but happens to be blind, as, for instance, man, but it could not be something which could never naturally possess sight, as, for instance, wall. The example for "negation" is a negative proposition, such as the proposition "A is not seeing." In this case, the subject A may be even something which naturally could never have sight, as, for instance, wall.[50] It may be remarked, in passing, that the illustration for "privation" from the term "blind" given by Alexander is based upon a text in Aristotle; [51] the illustration given by him for "negation" is not found in Aristotle. But how about an affirmative proposition in which the predicate is privative both in form and in meaning, such as, for instance, "A is sightless (ἄδερκτος)," would that be a "privation" or a "negation"? In Aristotle there are various statements on this point. On the one hand, the proposition "A is toothless (νωδός)" is taken by him to be a "privation." [52] But, on the other hand, such propositions as "a voice is invisible (ἀόρατος)" [53] and "a unit . . . is indi-

[49] Metaph. IV, 2, 1004a, 10–16.
[50] Alexander in Metaphysica, ed. M. Hayduck, p. 327, ll. 18–20.
[51] Categ. 10, 12a, 27–34.
[52] Ibid. 10, 12a, 31–34.
[53] Phys. III, 5, 204a, 13–14; V, 2, 206b, 10–11; Metaph. XI, 10, 1066a, 36.

visible (ἀδιαίρετος) in quantity" [54] and "is positionless (ἄθετος)" [55] are used by him as "negations." From these statements, apparently contradictory, one would be justified to conclude that affirmative propositions with negative predicates had with Aristotle the meaning of both privations and negations. This conclusion is strengthened by the statement, made by Aristotle, that "the immobility (ἀκινησία) of that to which motion belongs [by nature] is rest," [56] the implication of which is that the immobility of that to which motion does not belong by nature is not rest but rather something which is a negation of both motion and rest. From this statement and its implication one may infer that the term "immobile," when used in a proposition in which the subject is "man," is a privation but, when used in a proposition in which the subject is "God," is a negation. In the history of the interpretation of Aristotle, it may be added in passing, two views may be found. One, that of the Stoics and Boethius, takes such propositions as privations; the other, that of Avicenna and Averroes, takes them as negations.[57]

In the light of this discussion, then, we may assume that when Philo, Albinus, Plotinus, and the Church Fathers allow the use of affirmative propositions with predicates negative in form, it is because they take a proposition of this type to be a "negation" and, as a negation, it has here the meaning of the exclusion of God from the universe of effability. When Basilides, however, does not allow the use of the proposition "God is ineffable," we may assume that it is because he takes a proposition of this type to be a "privation," and, as a "privation," it would imply that God, who by His own nature could be effable, just happens to be ineffable. It would not mean, he says in effect, that God is "absolutely ineffable." He therefore insists upon a proposition that is unmistakably a negation, such as "God is not even ineffable." We may further assume that he would allow also such a proposition as "God is not effable," which in Aristotle is definitely taken as a "negation." The reason why he uses the proposition

[54] Metaph. XIV, 2, 1089b, 35–36.
[55] Ibid. V, 6, 1016b, 30.
[56] Phys. III, 2, 202a, 4–5.
[57] Cf. my paper "Infinite and Privative Judgments in Aristotle, Averroes, and Kant," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8 (1947), 173–187.

"God is not even ineffable" is obviously in order to place himself directly in opposition to those before him who did use the proposition "God is ineffable." As to who were those before him who used the expression "God is ineffable," it depends upon whether Hippolytus' report of the teachings in the name of Basilides is authentic or not. If authentic, then the only one who before Basilides, that is, before the reign of Hadrian (117–138), is known to have used that expression is Philo,[58] and it is Philo, therefore, whom he had in mind in his opposition to the use of the term "ineffable" as a predicate of God.

Towards the end of the chapter in which he has restated the view of Basilides, as quoted by us above, Hippolytus says that "Aristotle, born many generations before Basilides, was the first to discourse, in the Categories, upon the subject of equivocal terms (*ὁμώνυμα*), which these men [that is, Basilides and his son Isidore] expound as their own and as a novelty." [59] It is not quite clear what he means by this statement. If he means that, besides negative predications, Basilides and his son allowed also affirmative predications, provided only that the positive terms affirmed of God were taken in an equivocal sense, then Basilides may be considered as being the first to introduce the equivocal interpretation of divine predicates. Apart from this vague statement, Maimonides, as I have shown elsewhere, was the first to state explicitly that all positive terms affirmed of God are to be taken not only as being negative in meaning but as also being equivocal in meaning,[60] and this view of his was made the target of attack, in Latin philosophy, by Thomas Aquinas [61] and, in Hebrew philosophy, by Gersonides.[62]

[58] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 110 ff.

[59] Hippolytus, op. cit. VII, 20, 5; cf. Categ. 1, 1a, 1–6.

[60] Cf. my papers "Maimonides on Negative Attributes," Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume, 1945, pp. 411–446, "Maimonides and Gersonides on Divine Attributes as Ambiguous Terms," Mordecai M. Kaplan Jubilee Volume, 1953, pp. 515–530.

[61] Sum. Theol. I, 13, 2c; cf. Cont. Gent. I, 33.

[62] Milhamot Adonai III, 3.

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